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1 
A TAX THEORY OF THE FIRM 
Richard Winchester* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States taxes business profits in two fundamentally different 
ways, depending on how the firm is classified by the tax system.1  In some 
cases, the rules treat the firm as an extension of its owners and impose no 
obligation on the firm to pay tax on its profits.2  Instead, the firm’s owners 
have to pay tax on their share of those profits, whether they receive a 
distribution from the firm or not.3  This describes the partnership model 
for taxing business profits and it is the default rule that applies to 
partnerships and other unincorporated business firms, including limited 
liability companies.4  Sole proprietorships are taxed in a similar fashion.5   
Under the second approach for taxing business profits, the firm and its 
owners are treated as separate and distinct taxpaying units.  Accordingly, 
the firm has an independent obligation to pay tax on any profits it derives, 
regardless if it retains those earnings or distributes them to its owners.6  
Additionally, the owners have a separate obligation to pay tax on any 
profits they actually receive from the firm.7  Thus, any earnings paid to 
the firm’s owners are subject to tax at both the firm level and the owner 
level.8  This two-tiered system describes the corporate model for taxing 
 
* Visiting Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law; J.D., Yale Law School; A.B., Princeton 
University.  I wish to thank Tracy Kaye, Ajay Mehrotra, Roberta Mann, and Stephen Lubben for their 
thoughtful feedback and comments on earlier versions of this Article.  However, I take full responsibility 
for any errors. 
 1. These two different approaches have existed in one form or another ever since Congress 
adopted an income tax after it gained full Constitutional power to enact such a tax without having to 
allocate the tax burden among the states based on population. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV.   
 2. E.g., I.R.C. § 701.   
 3. Id.  
 4. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)(i). The Internal Revenue Code contains several variations of 
the partnership model of taxation.  See Willard Taylor, Can We Clean This Up? A Brief Journey Through 
the United States Rules for Taxing Business Entities, 19 FLA. TAX REV. 323 (2016).  The vast majority of 
those rules apply to specialized industries and situations.  However, the rules of subchapter S give many 
incorporated firms the option to have their profits taxed under a partnership model of taxation.  See I.R.C. 
§§ 1361-1379.  
 5. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(2) and 162(a).  
 6. I.R.C. § 11.  
 7. I.R.C. § 61(a)(7).  
 8. This is why many refer to this scheme as one that imposes a “double tax” on dividends.  E.g., 
Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Uncertain Case Against the Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 68 N.C.L. REV. 
613 (1990); Terrence R. Chorvat, Apologia for the Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 38 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 239 (2003); Michael Doran, Managers, Shareholders, and the Corporate Double Tax, 95 
VA. L. REV. 517 (2009).  The implication is that dividends are taxed at twice the rate that would ordinarily 
apply. However, that is misleading because the tax is not necessarily twice what it would be.    
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business profits.  It is the default method that now applies to any business 
that is organized as a corporation under state law.9   
Many scholars have questioned the merits of having two vastly 
different approaches for taxing business profits.10  However, Congress is 
unlikely to adopt a uniform method for taxing business profits anytime 
soon.  That makes it imperative to have a rational way to determine when 
one approach should yield to the other.  That requires one to examine the 
tax law’s entity classification rules, because a firm’s tax classification 
dictates how its profits are taxed. 
For decades, the tax rules for classifying business firms focused on 
legal and formalistic factors.  This practice can be traced back to the 
formative years of the modern income tax when the corporate tax applied 
to any firm that was incorporated under state law.11  However, under 
regulations issued by the Treasury Department, any unincorporated firm 
could also be subject to the tax if it possessed certain distinctively 
corporate characteristics.12  Over time, the government made certain 
modifications to the rules, which became known as the resemblance test.  
The focus, however, has always been whether the firm possessed the 
legalistic and formalistic characteristics that are distinctively corporate.13 
By 1960, the regulations were refined to include the following list of six 
 
 9. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1). These rules also control the taxation of firms organized as 
joint stock companies and associations.  See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2)-(7). The same rules also apply 
to any partnership that qualifies as a publicly traded partnership.  See I.R.C. § 7701(a).  
 10. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-Through Corporate-
Shareholder Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 265 (1995) (proposing to integrate the corporate-
shareholder income tax); Daniel Halperin, Fundamental Tax Reform, 48 EMORY L.J. 809 (1999) 
(proposing a combination of changes, including full indexation and corporate integration); and Anthony 
P. Polito, Note, A Proposal for an Integrated Income Tax, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1009 (1989) 
(arguing that integration would advance horizontal and vertical equity).  However, there have been several 
arguments advanced defending the policy of applying the corporate tax to incorporated firms.  See Heather 
M. Field, Checking in on “Check-the-Box”, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 451, 509-15 (2009) (summarizing the 
arguments, critiquing them, and citing sources).  
 11. It was not entirely clear whether the initial legislation creating the modern income tax actually 
imposed the corporate tax on business entities other than state law corporations and joint-stock companies.  
See Patrick E. Hobbs, Entity Classification:  The One Hundred-Year Debate, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 437, 
459-466 (1995) (discussing the ambiguities imbedded in the Revenue Acts of 1913 and 1916). However, 
by 1918, it was clear that an unincorporated business entity could indeed be subject to the corporate tax. 
Id. at 467.  
 12. See Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1502, T.D. 3146, 23 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. at 591 (1921). Thus, a trust 
would be treated as equivalent to a corporation if it engaged in an active business and if the beneficiaries 
had control over the manner in which the trustees conducted the business. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1504, 23 
Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. at 591.  Meanwhile, a partnership could be subject to the corporate tax if the firm’s 
interests were freely transferable and some of its members were passive investors. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 
1503, 23 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. at 591. A third rule treated a limited partnership as a corporation for tax 
purposes if it provided for limited liability, freely transferable interests and the right to bring suit in a 
common name.  Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1506, 23 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. at 592.  
 13. See Hobbs, supra note 11, at 437 (recounting in rich detail the evolution of the rules for 
classifying firms as corporations for tax purposes).   
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corporate characteristics: (1) associates, (2) an objective to carry on 
business activity and to distribute the resulting profits, (3) continuity of 
life, (4) centralized management, (5) limited liability, and (6) free 
transferability of interests.14   
Even though the government has consistently used such factors to 
determine whether an unincorporated firm resembles a corporation, it has 
not taken a consistent approach in the way it evaluates and weighs those 
factors. Instead, the government has recalibrated the test in response to 
taxpayer efforts to qualify for a tax classification that yields a particular 
tax outcome. Thus, in the early years, when corporate dividends were 
taxed more heavily than other business profits, taxpayers structured their 
business ventures in ways that would prevent a business entity from 
qualifying as a corporation. The Treasury’s response was to make the 
rules apply in a way that was biased in favor of treating such an 
unincorporated firm as a corporation.15  Later, when it became more tax 
advantageous to be treated as a corporation, Treasury recalibrated the 
rules so that it was more difficult for an unincorporated firm to qualify as 
one.16  It was apparent that the factors listed in the regulations could be 
manipulated by taxpayers to achieve a certain tax result without adversely 
affecting the desired economic outcome.17  This exposed the inherent 
defect in the government’s entity classification rules:  the factors used to 
classify business entities were entirely formalistic and legalistic; they had 
no bearing on the economic realities that truly mattered to taxpayers. 
After decades of less than satisfactory results with its approach for 
classifying business entities, the Internal Revenue Service abandoned the 
emphasis on legal formalities. Today, a firm can explicitly opt out of the 
default tax rules that would ordinarily apply to it in the vast majority of 
cases. Thus, a partnership can choose to be classified as a corporation so 
that its profits are first taxed to the firm and later taxed to the owners in 
the event the firm actually distributes its profits to them.18  Similarly, 
many corporations can choose to have their profits taxed under a modified 
version of the partnership model, so that the shareholders are taxed on 
their shares of the firm’s profits while the firm itself pays no tax.19   
Understandably, taxpayers welcome the flexibility to choose the rules 
 
 14. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2 (1960), T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409.   
 15. Hobbs, supra note 11, at 477 (discussing the regulations issued under the 1934 Revenue Act).   
 16. Id. at 486; Field, supra note 10, at 460 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1960)).  
 17. This was particularly true if the firm was organized as a limited liability company under state 
law.  The Internal Revenue Service acknowledged as much.  See I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-14 I.R.B. 7.  
 18. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2006). A separate statutory provision permits a 
partnership to elect not to be subject to the rules that would ordinarily apply to the firm.  I.R.C. § 761(a).  
However, that rule does not technically reclassify the partnership as a corporation for tax purposes.  
 19. See I.R.C. §§ 1363, 1366.  
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that apply to them.20  After all, this allows them to control two key things: 
(1) the amount of tax owed on the firm’s profits, and (2) the timing of the 
tax liability. However, this freedom to choose has been criticized on 
equitable and other grounds.21  Importantly, giving individual taxpayers 
the power to choose what to pay and when to pay it does not represent 
sound tax policy, especially in a tax system that purports to operate on the 
basis of an individual’s ability to pay.22  For example, when individuals 
can choose the rules that apply to them, taxpayers with the same capacity 
to pay may end up paying different tax amounts solely because one 
taxpayer can disguise her ability to pay, violating the principle of 
horizontal equity.  That, in turn, makes it harder for the tax system to 
fulfill a related principle known as vertical equity, which generally 
requires individuals with greater ability to pay to actually pay more than 
individuals who have a lower ability to pay.  If some taxpayers can 
artificially lower their tax bill despite their ability to pay, then individuals 
with the greatest capacity to pay will not pay an amount that reflects their 
ability to pay relative to other taxpayers.  
The misplaced emphasis on legal formalities comes into sharp focus if 
you consider the case of a wholly owned corporation. In such a case, the 
firm’s sole owner has complete control over the firm and is entitled to any 
profits derived by the firm. As an economic matter, the firm is 
indistinguishable from its owner. Yet the tax code treats the corporation 
as a separate and distinct entity.23  That makes the firm–not the owner–
solely responsible for the tax on any profits it generates and retains. This 
would not be particularly problematic if the corporation and its owner 
were taxed at the same rate. But that is rarely the case. Given the 
shortcomings of the entity classification election, scholars have offered 
alternative ways to classify firms on a mandatory basis. One popular idea 
is to treat small firms differently from large ones. Specifically, many 
scholars argue that publicly traded firms should be classified as 
corporations, while all other firms should be taxed like partnerships.24  
Other scholars suggest using a different set of factors, such as whether the 
firm offers its owners limited liability from the firm’s debts, to determine 
 
 20. Field, supra note 10, at 466-69.  
 21. E.g., George K. Yin, The Future Taxation of Private Business Firms, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 141, 
149-50 (1999); Field, supra note 10, at 451.  
 22. See, e.g., Allison Christians, Introduction to Tax Policy Theory (unpublished manuscript 2018) 
(describing the fundamental objectives of tax policy).  
 23. See Moline Properties v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).  
 24. American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Project – Taxation of Private Business 
Enterprises (George K. Yin & David J. Shakow reps.) (1999); Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and 
Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573 (1986); Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A 
Catalyst Exposing the Corporate Integration Question, 95 MICH. L. REV. 393 (1996).  
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the firm’s tax classification.25   
However, these proposals are unlikely to adequately address the 
inequities that now plague the taxation of business profits because they 
do not account for the one factor that may be the most salient for tax 
purposes: the way a firm behaves. Because the tax code conceptualizes a 
firm as either an extension of its owners or as a separate and distinct 
entity, any entity classification rules should focus solely on factors that 
affect whether the firm behaves in one of those two ways. Such factors 
might form the basis of what this Article describes as a “tax theory of the 
firm.” A sound tax theory of the firm justifies a firm’s tax classification 
because it accurately identifies the factors that explain certain behaviors 
of the firm that are relevant and meaningful for tax purposes.  
This Article proposes a tax theory of the firm by examining the origins 
and evolution of the modern American approach for taxing business 
profits. This approach first took shape when the Constitution was 
amended to authorize Congress to impose an income tax without having 
to apportion the burden among the states based on population. Up to that 
point, the U.S. had a uniform rule for taxing all business profits.  That rule 
effectively treated all firms as extensions of their owners, a reflection of 
the fact that virtually all firms were, in fact, closely held and generally 
operated in partnership form.  
It was only when massive corporations began to dominate the 
economic landscape starting in the late 1800s that Congress introduced a 
second method for taxing business profits.  Although the new rules 
applied to all corporations, Congress consistently recognized that closely 
held corporations raised special concerns because the owners could hide 
behind the entity to avoid certain tax obligations without sacrificing any 
meaningful control over the assets held by the firm or the income derived 
by it.   For that reason, there have always been provisions that suspend 
the ordinary rules for taxing corporate profits in certain cases.  At first, 
there was a subjective test that proved to be ineffective, leading Congress 
to adopt an objective test that has since been replicated in various ways to 
serve the same principal objective: to prevent taxpayers from using a 
corporation to avoid the full tax on their business profits. 
This Article recounts the journey that Congress took to devise an 
objective way to distinguish cases where the ordinary rules for taxing 
corporate profits should be suspended.  This history reveals that Congress 
always used concentration of ownership as the basis for making this 
distinction.  Moreover, the emphasis on concentration of ownership is 
consistent with the insights offered by well-established economic theories 
 
 25. Jeffrey A. Maine, Linking Limited Liability and Entity Taxation:  A Critique of the ALI 
Reporters’ Study on the Taxation of Private Business Enterprises, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 223 (2000).  
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that attempt to explain the behavior of business firms.  Such theories view 
ownership of the firm as central to any understanding about how the firm 
behaves vis-à-vis the owner.  Thus, there is strong historical and 
theoretical support to use concentration of ownership as the basis for any 
meaningful tax theory of the firm.  Such a theory acknowledges that a 
firm can be expected to act as an extension of its owners whenever the 
ownership of the firm is sufficiently concentrated.  That would create a 
presumption that the profits of the business should be taxed under 
partnership-type rules.  Conversely, if a firm lacks a sufficiently high 
concentration of ownership, the firm can be expected to behave like an 
entity that is separate and distinct from its owners.  That would justify 
taxing the firm profits under corporate-type rules. 
The concentration of ownership principle plays a central role a wide 
range of anti-abuse tax rules designed to prevent taxpayers from using 
corporations to disguise their identities.  Moreover, each of these rules 
measures concentration of ownership by applying an objective test that 
generally asks whether five or fewer persons own over half the value of 
the company, a formulation that first appeared in a provision known as 
the personal holding company rules.26  Because the “five-or-fewer” 
formula and its variations have been battle tested over the years, it offers 
a promising way to determine whether a firm should be treated as an entity 
that is separate and distinct from its owners for tax purposes.   
The 2017 Tax Act changed the Internal Revenue Code in ways that 
make it more urgent than ever to reform the rules for classifying business 
entities. Under prior law, the vast majority of closely held firms chose not 
to be classified as corporations for tax purposes because the tax on the 
firm’s profits was generally lower.  Thus, closely held firms were usually 
classified in the same way they would likely be classified under the 
mandatory entity classification system that this Article is proposing.  
However, the 2017 Tax Act changed the tax landscape in substantial 
ways.  It reduced the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent and 
introduced a new 20 percent deduction for all firms not classified as 
corporations.27 The combination of these new rules will complicate the 
process of choosing the most tax advantageous entity classification for 
the firm.28  At the very least, the corporate classification will become more 
tax advantageous for some firms than it was under prior law.  Firms that 
reclassify themselves will no longer be treated as if they are an extension 
 
 26. See I.R.C. § 542(a)(2).  
 27. See Pub. L. No. 115-97 §§ 11011, 13001 (2017) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 11, 199A).  
 28. Bradley T. Borden, Income-Based Effective Rates and Choice-of-Entity Considerations under 
the 2017 Tax Act, 71 NAT’L TAX J.  613 (2018); Erin Henry, George A. Plesko & Steven Utke, Tax Policy 
and Organizational Form: Assessing the Effects of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, 71 NAT’L TAX J.  
635 (2018).  
6
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss1/1
2019] A TAX THEORY OF THE FIRM 7 
of their owners, even though the firm can be expected to behave in 
precisely that way.  The mandatory entity classification system being 
proposed in this Article will help ensure that the tax consequences match 
the economic realities.  It will also eliminate the complexities that plague 
the current system. 
Part II of this Article describes the nineteenth century antecedents of 
the income tax and the conditions that gave rise to a uniform approach for 
taxing business profits.  Part III describes the formative years of the 
modern income tax when Congress first introduced a unique approach for 
taxing corporate profits.  Part III specifically focuses on the subjective 
rules initially adopted to deter and penalize taxpayers from using 
corporations to disguise their true identities.  Part IV recounts the events 
that culminated in the enactment of the personal holding company rules, 
which not only were the first to embrace the concentration of ownership 
principle, but also reduced it to an objective test.  Part V examines how 
the approach for taxing corporate profits evolved to where it emphatically 
operates as a tax on the firm as an entity, not as an indirect tax on its 
owners.  Part VI describes Internal Revenue Code provisions that employ 
variations of personal holding company ownership test to determine 
whether the ordinary rules for taxing corporate profits should be 
suspended.  Part VII summarizes the principal economic theories of firm 
behavior and the way they consistently revolve around a firm’s 
concentration of ownership.  Part VIII articulates a tax theory of the firm 
and offers an initial assessment of its power and potential limitations.  
Finally, Part IX concludes.   
II. THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE MODERN INCOME TAX 
The modern U.S. income tax incorporates several key elements that 
first appeared in the Revenue Acts adopted during the Civil War.  Those 
temporary laws contained one uniform method for taxing business profits.  
Such income was consistently taxed to the owners of the business, not to 
the business itself.  Thus, the country’s earliest rules for taxing income 
treated all firms as extensions of their owners and applied what we now 
regard as the partnership model for taxing business profits.  This largely 
reflected the prevailing economic realities.  With rare exception, all 
business firms were closely held partnerships whose owners played an 
active role in managing the business.  Even firms that did not fit this 
description routinely distributed all their earnings to their owners so that 
the recipients–not the firms–were in sole possession of the firm’s profits. 
7
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A. The 1862 Income Tax: Business Profits are Implicitly Taxed to a 
Firm’s Owners at Progressive Rates 
Enacted in 1862 to help finance the Civil War,29 the country’s first 
income tax did not tax business firms directly.30  Instead, the individuals 
who owned a share of a firm were taxed on their share of the firm’s 
profits.31  Those profits, along with all other income derived by the 
taxpayer, were subject to tax at one of two rates, depending on the 
taxpayer’s income level.  Individuals with incomes up to $10,000 were 
taxed at 3 percent, while those with incomes over $10,000 were taxed at 
5 percent.32  In either case, the first $600 of income was tax exempt.33    
There was one exception to this general rule.  The statute imposed a 
three percent tax on the profits that certain financial institutions and 
railroad companies paid out to their owners as dividends.34  However, 
because that tax actually represented a prepayment of the tax that the 
shareholders were required to pay on their share of the firm’s earnings, 
the dividends were exempt from tax in the hands of the recipients.35  This 
procedure did not produce any distortions or inequities because it was the 
general practice for businesses of all sizes and legal forms to distribute all 
their earnings to the owners.36  The three percent tax that the firm withheld 
would have understated the actual tax liability for any recipient who was 
subject to tax at five percent.  Although the Act had no mechanism for 
addressing this discrepancy, the government’s policy was to require the 
 
 29. JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 68 (1985).  
The objective was to reduce the government’s need to borrow money.  DAVID HERBERT DONALD, ET AL., 
THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 296 (2001).  As a technical matter, this was not the country’s 
first income tax.  In 1861, Congress enacted a 3 percent tax on income.  Act of August 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 
49, 12 Stat. 292, 309.  However, the government never collected any tax under the measure because the 
Treasury Secretary concluded it would cost more to collect than the government would raise, a result of a 
relatively high $800 exemption.  SHELDON D. POLLACK, WAR, REVENUE, AND STATE BUILDING: 
FINANCING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN STATE 224 (2009).  See also, Steven A. Bank, Origins 
of a Flat Tax, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 345 (1996).  Thus, for all practical purposes, the income tax 
adopted in 1862 represents the country’s first real life experience with an income tax. 
 30. However, certain firms had to pay a tax on their gross receipts.  E.g., Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 
119 § 80, 12 Stat. 468 (railroads, steamboats and ferryboats). 
 31. Taxable income was defined to include all profits, dividends and income “derived” from any 
source whatever.  Id. § 90, 12 Stat. 432, 473.  
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. §§ 81 and 82, 12 Stat. at 469-71. The financial institutions included banks, trust companies, 
savings institutions and all fire, marine, life and inland insurance companies, whether operating as stock 
or mutual institutions.  Id. § 82. They also had to pay a 3 percent tax on all amounts added to their surplus 
or contingent funds.  Id. Railroads also had to withhold tax on interest paid.  Id. § 81. The recipient was 
granted a corresponding deduction for the interest.  Id. § 91.   
 35. Id. § 91. 
 36. Steven A. Bank, Is Double Taxation a Scapegoat for Declining Dividends? Evidence from 
History, 56 TAX L. REV. 463, 473 (2003). 
8
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss1/1
2019] A TAX THEORY OF THE FIRM 9 
recipient to pay an additional two percent in tax to make up the 
difference.37  Thus, the overall arrangement operated in a way that made 
the tax paid by the firm a prepayment of the one owed by the recipient of 
the firm’s earnings.   
The government had a sound reason to require railroads and financial 
institutions to pay the tax on behalf of the recipients of the income.  The 
legislation relied on individuals to accurately report and pay tax on any 
income they derived.  Instead of relying solely on the honesty of 
individual taxpayers for this to happen, Congress effectively enlisted 
certain firms to act as tax collection agents for the government.38  
Railroads were especially well suited for this job.  At the time of the 
legislation, they constituted the largest and most visible commercial 
enterprise in the country, making it potentially difficult and risky for them 
to renege on their obligation to withhold tax on any payments.39  By 
shifting the obligation to pay from the recipient to the company, the 
government accomplished two things: (1) it made it easier to administer 
the laws, and (2) it limited the possibility of tax evasion.40     
All subsequent tax legislation enacted during the nineteenth century 
followed the basic structure of the 1862 Act. Namely, each piece of 
legislation imposed a tax on individuals, often under a progressive 
schedule of rates.  In addition, no revenue law taxed business firms as 
such.  Instead, they required certain firms to collect and remit the tax on 
the business profits payable to the firm’s owners. A quick description of 
those revenue laws will reveal just how carefully the rules were drafted 
to ensure that the tax collected by the government on business profits 
neither understated nor overstated the amount that would have been due 
had the firm’s owners been required to pay it themselves.  This 
examination reveals just how strongly Congress intended to tax business 
profits in a uniform way and to treat business firms as mere extensions of 
 
 37. GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, A MANUAL OF THE DIRECT AND EXCISE TAX SYSTEM OF THE UNITED 
STATES 197 (1863).  One could imagine that a dividend would be overtaxed in the hands of a recipient 
whose income was low enough to make them exempt from tax.  However, it seems unlikely that an 
individual whose income did not exceed the $600 exemption would have been in a position to invest in 
dividend paying stock.  This seems supported by the fact that the tax on dividends accounted for a very 
small share of total income tax revenues.  ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF 
ORDER:  ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1961 – 1913, at 279 n. 74 (1993). 
 38. Congress modeled its system of tax collection after the British, who devised it as a bulwark 
against tax evasion.  See Ajay K. Mehrotra, “From Contested Concept to Cornerstone of Administrative 
Practice”:  Social Learning and the Early History of U.S. Tax Withholding, 7 COLUM. J. TAX L. 144, 153-
55 (2016) (describing the British experience with taxing income at its source and the extent to which it 
inspired U.S. lawmakers). 
 39. Thomas R. Navin & Marian V. Sears, The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities, 1887-
1902, 29 BUS. HIST. REV. 105, 106 (1955). 
 40. Frederick C. Howe, The Federal Revenues and the Income Tax, 4 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.  
SOC. SCI. 557, 568 (1894); Joseph A. Hill, The Civil War Income Tax, 8 Q.J. ECON. 416, 427 (1894). 
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their owners.   
B. The 1864 Income Tax: Business Profits Are Explicitly Taxed to a 
Firm’s Owners at Progressive Rates 
Congress more emphatically treated all firms as extensions of their 
owners in all cases in the Revenue Act of 1864.  This legislation amended 
and restructured the income tax in order to raise additional money to 
finance the Civil War.41  There were two important differences from the 
Act of 1862.  First, the tax rates were higher than before.  Second, the 
schedule of tax rates applied in bracketed fashion, which introduced a bit 
of complexity into the computation of the tax.  Under the bracketed 
approach, an individual was exempt on the first $600 of income, a five 
percent tax applied to amounts over $600 and up to $5,000, and a ten 
percent tax applied to amounts over $5,000.42  Business profits were 
expressly taxed to the individual owners of a firm, and it did not matter if 
the firm actually distributed its profits to them.43  The government 
continued to rely on certain firms as its tax collection agents, with such 
firms having the obligation to pay a five percent tax on the profits derived 
by the firm, whether paid out as a dividend or added to the firm’s surplus. 
44   
The Act used a sophisticated tax credit mechanism to ensure that the 
government collected the correct amount of tax on an individual’s share 
of the profits of firms enlisted to collect tax. The five percent tax paid by 
the firm would understate the liability of an investor in the ten percent tax 
 
 41. Hill, supra note 40, at 423.  
 42. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 469, 479, amending Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173 § 116, 
13 Stat. 223, 281.  Prior to the amendment, an individual was exempt on the first $600 of income, a 5 
percent tax applied to amounts over $600 and up to $5,000, a 7.5 percent tax applied to amounts over 
$5,000 and up to $10,000, and a 10 percent tax applied to amounts over $10,000.  Congress made the 
change in order to reduce a shortfall in expected revenues. STANLEY, supra note 37, at 35 (1993). 
 43. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 469, 480, amending Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 117, 
13 Stat. 223, 282 (“[A taxpayer’s] share of the gains and profits of all companies, whether incorporated 
or partnership, shall be included in estimating the annual gains, profits, or income of any person entitled 
to the same, whether divided or otherwise.”).  The regulations issued by the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue left no room for doubt: an individual would be subject to tax on the undivided profits of a 
corporation.  See DIGEST OF DECISIONS AND REGULATIONS MADE BY THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL 
REVENUE, 1864 – 1898, at 16, 36, 37, 39, 40 (1906).  In dictum, the Supreme Court concurred with this 
interpretation.  Collector v. Hubbard, 79 U.S. 1, 18 (1870).  By contrast, under the prior statute, only 
financial institutions were taxed on their undivided surplus; the railroads were not. See supra note 34. 
 44. The list was expanded to include any canal, turnpike, canal navigation or slackwater company, 
in addition to the firms singled out under the 1862 Act.  Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 120, 13 Stat. 
223, 283-84. Coincidentally, this list closely tracks the list of firms that had historically been organized 
as corporations even prior to the introduction of general corporation laws.  WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN 
STREET AND WALL STREET 21 (1973) (reprint of the 1929 edition) (observing that for long after the 
adoption of the Constitution, the corporate form was not the normal form of organization except for a few 
businesses like banking, insurance, turnpikes, and bridges). 
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bracket.  But, two rules eliminated this discrepancy.  The first required 
the dividend to be included in the investor’s tax base.45  The second gave 
the investor credit for the five percent tax paid by the firm, leaving the 
investor responsible for the difference.46  This procedure ensured that the 
method for taxing business profits remained uniform across all taxpayers.  
It also reaffirmed the fact that the tax on business profits was indeed the 
liability of the investor, not the firm.47   
C. 1867-1872: Business Profits Are Explicitly Taxed to a Firm’s Owners 
at a Flat Rate 
Congress simplified the tax laws in 1867 by replacing the two-tiered 
graduated rates with a five percent flat tax on all income in excess of a 
$1,000 exempt amount.48  Taxable income continued to include an 
individual’s share of the profits of any business, and it remained irrelevant 
whether the firm distributed the profits or not.49  The firms previously 
enlisted to pay a five percent tax on their profits had to continue doing so, 
while distributions paid by such firms remained excluded from the 
recipient’s taxable income.50  This simplified structure resembled the 
1862 approach. The government collected a five percent tax on all 
business profits, with the tax paid by either the firm or the shareholder.  
In 1870, Congress reduced the tax rate and increased the exemption, but 
made no changes to the basic method for taxing business profits.51  It also 
scheduled the income tax to expire after 1871, which did occur, partially 
thanks to strong lobbying efforts against an income tax.52   
 
 45. See supra note 43. 
 46. Id. Under the legislation originally enacted in 1864, there was no provision for a tax credit. 
Instead, an individual was simply not subject to tax on any dividend received from a taxable firm.  See 
Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 117, 13 Stat. 281. Congress amended those rules in 1865 before its 
provisions went into effect to address the possibility that specific individuals would be overtaxed or 
undertaxed.  See Richard Winchester, Corporations That Weren’t: The Taxation of Firm Profits in 
Historical Perspective, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 501, 506 (2010). 
 47. The Supreme Court made this abundantly clear, too. U.S. v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 84 U.S. 322 
(1872).  The case involved a challenge to the withholding rule as it applied to interest payments.  However, 
the operative provision of the statute also applied to dividends. The railroad refused to withhold tax on 
interest payments made to a tax-exempt recipient. The government sued, and a unanimous court rejected 
the government’s claim.  Id. at 326. 
 48. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 13, 14 Stat. 471, 477-78. 
 49. Id. § 13, 14 Stat. 478. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255 § 8, 16 Stat. 258. The 5 percent levy remained in effect through 
1870.  Id. § 17, 16 Stat. 261.  The 2.5 percent levy applied for the next two years.  Id. § 15, 16 Stat. 260. 
 52. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255 § 6, 16 Stat. 256, 257. Once hostilities between the states ended, 
wealthy individuals successfully pressured the government to repeal the tax, stressing that it was a 
temporary measure intended to meet the needs of the war and nothing more.  Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Equity 
versus Efficiency and the U.S. Tax System in Historical Perspective, in TAX JUSTICE: THE ONGOING 
DEBATE 25, 29 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. eds., 2002); Edwin R.A. Seligman, THE 
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D. The 1894 Income Tax: Congress Resurrects the Income Tax and the 
Supreme Court Rejects It 
Congress resurrected the income tax in 1894 in response to growing 
political pressure to reform the existing system of tariffs, which reached 
historic levels under the McKinley Tariff of 1890.53  Notoriously 
inequitable, the tariffs effectively protected domestic manufacturing 
industries from foreign competition while forcing farmers and urban 
workers to shoulder the cost in the form of higher prices for manufactured 
goods.54  Congress addressed the inequity by eliminating the sugar tariff 
and adopting a modest income tax to make up for the lost revenue.55  The 
legislation contained an income tax that resembled the one that expired in 
1872.  It required individuals to pay a flat two percent tax on income 
above a $4,000 exempt amount.56  It also imposed a two percent tax on 
the entire net income of certain business firms, whether distributed or 
not.57  This time, the list of taxpayers grew to include all “corporations, 
companies, or associations doing business for profit” other than 
partnerships.58  As in the past, any distributions by such firms were tax 
 
INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND 
ABROAD 466-68 (1911). 
 53. Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567. See also Sheldon D. Pollack, Origins of the Modern 
Income Tax, 1894-1913, 66 TAX LAW. 295, 297-98 (2013).   
 54. Pollack, supra note 53, at 297-98.  See also FRANK W. TAUSSIG, THE TARIFF HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1888) for a definitive account of U.S. tariff policy in the nineteenth century. 
 55. Id. at 302, 304-05 (describing the reasons certain Republicans supported the measure). See 
also Sven Steinmo, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY: SWEDISH, BRITISH, AND AMERICAN APPROACHES TO 
FINANCING THE MODERN STATE 70 (1993) (describing the positions of populists within and outside the 
Democratic Party). 
 56. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 509, 553.  Under prior law, the tax was 2.5 percent 
and the exemption was $1,000. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 13, 14 Stat. 471, 477-78 amended by Act 
of July 14, 1870, ch. 255 § 6, 16 Stat. 256, 257. An individual’s tax base consisted of all “profits, and 
income . . . of every business, trade, or profession . . . .” Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 509, 
553.  
 57. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. at 556. The Act specifically provided that: 
 
The net profits or income of all corporations, companies, or associations shall include the amounts 
paid to shareholders, or carried to the account of any fund or used for construction enlargement of 
plant or any other expenditure or investment paid from the net annual profits made or acquired by 
said corporations, companies, or associations. 
 58. Id. § 32, 28 Stat. at 556.  The entire provision read as follows: 
 
That there shall be assessed, levied, and collected, except as herein otherwise provided, a tax of 
two per centum annually on the net profits or income . . . of all banks, banking institutions, trust 
companies, savings institutions, fire, marine, life, and other insurance companies, railroad, canal, 
turnpike, canal navigation, slack water, telephone, telegraph, express, electric light, gas, water, 
street railway companies, and all other corporations, companies, or associations doing business 
for profits in the united States, no matter how created and organized, but not including 
partnerships. 
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exempt to the recipient.59  
However, the 1894 income tax never took effect because the Supreme 
Court invalidated it soon after its enactment.60  In a 5-4 decision, the Court 
concluded that the measure constituted a “direct” tax, which had to be 
“apportioned” among the states by population in order to satisfy 
constitutional requirements.61  Because the tax did not meet that 
condition, the Court rejected it,62 leaving the existing system of tariffs as 
the sole source of revenue for the government.   
E. The 1909 Income Tax: Congress Passes Its First Tax on 
Corporations  
Congress passed its first tax on corporations in 1909.  President Taft 
introduced the legislation as a way to neutralize bipartisan Congressional 
pressure for a universal income tax.63  A group of bipartisan lawmakers 
proposed a tax largely modeled after the ones that preceded it.  The 
measure consisted of a two percent tax on all net income of individuals 
and corporations in excess of $5,000.  Corporate dividends were excluded 
from a shareholder’s taxable income.64  In addition, in cases where an 
individual’s net income fell within the $5,000 exemption, the government 
would have reimbursed the amount that the company paid on the 
recipient’s share of its earnings.65  Although different in certain technical 
respects, the legislation would have extended the tradition of taxing all 
business profits in a uniform way.  The bipartisan measure eventually 
attracted enough support to force a vote on it, threatening the fate of the 
tariff bill.66   
Firmly opposed to any form of an income tax, Old Guard Republican 
leaders in Congress worked with President Taft to craft a legislative 
 
The original draft legislation imposed a tax on business forms whose owners had limited liability.  26 
CONG. REC. 1594-95 (1894) (section 59 of a proposed amendment to the tariff bill (section 32 of the Act)). 
 59. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. at 554. 
 60. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). 
 61. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among 
the several States” based on population).  See also id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (“No capitation, or other direct, tax 
shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”). 
 62. The decision was very controversial because it seemed to reverse what was thought to be 
settled law. The Civil War income tax was considered to be an indirect tax when it was drafted.  See 
George S. Boutwell, The Income Tax, 160 N. AM. REV. 589, 600-01 (1895). Moreover, the Court 
reaffirmed that position only 15 years earlier.  See Springer v. U.S., 102 U.S. 586 (1880).   
 63. Pollack, supra note 53, at 316.  The administration specifically considered a tax on corporate 
dividends and a corporate income tax.  ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME 
TAX 40-42 (1940). 
 64. 44 CONG. REC. 1352 (1909). 
 65. 44 CONG. REC. 3137 (1909). 
 66. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note  63, at 33. Pollack, supra note 53, at 315. 
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counterproposal.67  Their response took the form of a two percent excise 
tax on the income of every corporation ostensibly for the privilege of the 
limited liability protection such firms enjoyed for doing business in 
corporate form.68  There were also provisions that required firms to 
publicize certain financial information.69  President Taft stressed how 
these provisions would give the federal government a degree of regulatory 
authority over corporations so as to prevent an abuse of power.70  As part 
of a strategic move to neutralize support for the bipartisan income tax 
proposal, President Taft also endorsed the idea of a Constitutional 
amendment that would give Congress the power to enact an income tax.71  
By specifically targeting corporations, the act capitalized on the growing 
unease about the ubiquitous presence of huge, unregulated commercial 
enterprises in the national economy.72 It was also during this period that 
it became more common to view the corporation as a separate legal entity 
instead of as an aggregation of its owners.73   
The bipartisan income tax proposal fell victim to the president’s 
strategy and was eliminated from consideration.74  That cleared the way 
for Congress to finalize the terms of the Corporate Excise Tax, which was 
ultimately signed into law on August 5, 1909.75  Thus, the legislation 
passed in large part because many Republicans viewed it as the lesser of 
two evils.  They did not like the idea of taxing corporations, but they liked 
the idea of an income tax even less.76   
In its final form, the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909 was a one percent 
tax on a corporation’s net income in excess of $5,000.77  Net income 
consisted of all gross income reduced by the firm’s operating expenses, 
losses, taxes, dividends received from taxable corporations, and interest 
up to the amount of the firm’s paid-up capital stock.78  The firms subject 
 
 67. Pollack, supra note 53, at 316. The leadership specifically considered a tax on corporate 
dividends and a corporate income tax.  BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 63, at 40-42. 
 68. See 44 CONG. REC. 3344-45 (1909) (Message from President Taft). Taft and the Congressional 
leaders also considered a tax on corporate dividends and a corporate income tax.  BLAKEY & BLAKEY, 
supra note 63, at 40-42. 
 69. 44 CONG. REC. 3344 (1909). 
 70. Id. This is very thoroughly examined by Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and 
the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53 (1990). 
 71. 44 CONG. REC. 3345 (1909). 
 72. Kornhauser, supra note 70, at 55-57. 
 73. Id. at 57-62. 
 74. Pollack, supra note 53, at 317-19; BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 63, at 47. 
 75. Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act, ch. 6, § 1, 36 Stat. 11, 112-18 (1909).  Certain non-profit 
organizations were exempt from the Act.  Although Old Guard Republicans were not thrilled with the tax, 
they believed it was better than the alternative.  Pollack, supra note 53, at 320.   
 76. See Pollack, supra note 53, at 319-20. 
 77. Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112 (1909). 
 78. Id. at 113-14. 
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to tax included any corporation, joint stock company or association 
having capital stock represented by shares.79  The Supreme Court upheld 
the tax as constitutional, concluding it was an indirect tax that did not 
have to be apportioned.80   
Although labeled an excise tax for the privilege of doing business in 
corporate form, a firm’s tax liability was based on its income.  However, 
it is not entirely clear that the measure was intended to operate as a tax on 
the firm itself.  There is evidence that lawmakers were attempting to reach 
the wealth of the individuals who owned corporate stock.81  There is also 
evidence that the measure would indirectly enable the government to 
control and regulate corporations.82  Whatever may have been the 
justification for the tax, it was a departure from the country’s tradition of 
taxing business profits in a uniform way.  The measure remained in 
existence until 1913, when it was incorporated into the modern income 
tax that remains in existence to this day.   
F. The Economic Backdrop for the Evolving Tax on Business Profits 
 The government’s approach for taxing business profits necessarily 
contemplated the prevailing business structures operating in the economy, 
as well as the way business firms were viewed in the eyes of the law.  
During the Civil War era, the typical business unit was a small, closely 
held firm whose owners also managed the business.83  For these firms, the 
size of the business was generally restricted by the personal wealth of the 
owners.84  If the owners needed outside financing, the only viable option 
was short term loans.85  Outside equity financing was almost never 
sought, partly because owners did not want to give anyone else a voice in 
their business.86   
Throughout the nineteenth century, the dominant business form was 
the partnership.87  This was particularly the case for small business 
 
 79. Id. at 112.  
 80. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911). 
 81. Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 43 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 447, 452 (2001). 
 82. Kornhauser, supra note 70. 
 83. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 2 (1940 ed.) (1932);  Navin & Sears, supra note 39, at 107.   
 84. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 83, at 2.   
 85. Navin & Sears, supra note 39, at 107.   
 86. Id. 
 87. Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Corporate Governance and the Plight of 
Minority Shareholders in the United States Before the Great Depression, in CORRUPTION AND REFORM: 
LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY 125, 129 (Edward L. Glaser and Claudia Goldin eds., 
2006); Navin & Sears, supra note 39, at 109-112. 
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firms.88  During the first half of the nineteenth century, the ubiquity of 
partnerships largely reflected the absence of an alternative.  Until mid-
century, corporate charters were only available through a special grant 
from the legislature.89  However, these special charters were severely 
criticized during the Jacksonian period as a source of political bribery and 
monopoly power.90  That characterization fueled a nationwide push for 
statutes that made the act of incorporation universally available to anyone.  
Between 1850 and 1870, such general incorporation laws gradually 
became the norm throughout the country.91  However, when incorporation 
became an option, small firms did not choose it in large numbers.92  That 
is because the corporate form was ill suited to the needs of a closely held 
firm.93  Such business ventures valued having a measure of flexibility in 
allocating ownership, control, and income rights; corporations were too 
rigid a structure to accommodate that need.   
 Perhaps most importantly, participants in an incorporated venture had 
virtually no practical way to exit the venture.  They were locked into the 
venture because there was unlikely to be an efficient market for shares in 
a small firm, leaving an owner unable to separate himself from the venture 
by selling his shares to a buyer.  This was a particularly unattractive 
feature in light of the fact that small firms faced a greater risk of being 
commandeered by an oppressive participant or incapacitated by deadlock 
between the participants.  By contrast, partners in a partnership enjoyed a 
presumptive right to withdraw from the venture at any time, even though 
doing so could effectively force the business to dissolve.   
Corporations had the advantage of offering shareholders the 
presumption that they enjoyed limited liability for the debts and 
obligations of the firm.94  However, during the early years of free 
incorporation, this rule frequently had to yield to higher legal authority.  
During the Civil War era, most states had constitutional or statutory 
provisions holding shareholders of an insolvent corporation liable for 
more than the value of their shares.95  The most typical provision, adopted 
in almost every state, imposed double liability on a corporation’s 
 
 88. Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, supra note 87, at 129; Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & 
Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1395 (2006). 
 89. Martin J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. 
L. REV. 173, 181 (1985). 
 90. Id.; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 
1593, 1635 (1988). 
 91. Horwitz, supra note 89, at 181. 
 92. Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, supra note 87, at 129; Hansmann, et al., supra note 88, at 1335, 1395.  
 93. Hansmann, et al., supra note 88, at 1395; Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, supra note 87, at 128. 
 94. See Hovenkamp, supra note 90, at 1651-1658 (recounting the origins and evolution of limited 
shareholder liability). 
 95. Horwitz, supra note 89, at 208. 
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shareholders.96  In some cases, the shareholders’ exposure was even 
greater.97   
Putting aside constitutional and statutory rules, courts would assert the 
Trust Fund Doctrine to hold innocent shareholders who purchased their 
shares at a discount liable for the difference between the stock’s par value 
and the purchase price.98  The Trust Fund Doctrine was honored for most 
of the nineteenth century until it became the target of attacks during the 
1890s.  Over time, the doctrine lost its vitality, in part because of the rise 
of a national stock market, which definitively converted shareholders to 
impersonal investors.99   
Considering all the tools available to creditors of an insolvent 
corporation during the nineteenth century, one scholar has concluded that 
truly limited shareholder liability was far from the norm in America even 
as late as 1900.100  Thus, even the virtues of limited liability may not have 
offered a benefit that would have permitted the corporate form to 
represent an appealing alternative to the partnership, which satisfied what 
may have been an overriding priority for someone investing in a small 
business: a way to get out.  The corporate form gradually became more 
attractive as a vehicle for operating smaller firms starting in the late 
nineteenth century, when courts began to recognize the power of the firm 
to restrict the transferability of shares.101  However, that power was not 
firmly established until well into the twentieth century.102   
Historical data reflects the overwhelming popularity of the partnership 
form for smaller firms.  In 1900, two-thirds of all manufacturing firms 
owned by more than one person were organized as partnerships.  
Moreover, firms operating as partnerships were significantly smaller than 
those choosing to incorporate in that year.  Partnerships accounted for 
$2.57 billion of goods produced, while corporations accounted for $7.73 
billion even though they were vastly outnumbered by partnerships.103  
Small firm incorporations increased at a steady pace over the next 
decades, but large numbers of partnerships were also formed.  These 
statistics confirm that the closely held, small firm was almost always a 
partnership during the nineteenth century, and that the partnership 
remained the overwhelming entity of choice well into the twentieth 
century for the small business venture.  
 
 96. Id. 
 97. See 3 S. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS VI, chs. 46, 
50 (1st ed. 1895) 
 98. Horwitz, supra note 89, at 208. 
 99. Id. at 209. 
 100. Id. at 208. 
 101. Hansmann, et al., supra note 88, at 1396. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, supra note 87, at 129.  
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Meanwhile, the largest firms were consistently organized as 
corporations throughout the nineteenth century and beyond.  The railroads 
were the most prominent example during the Civil War era.  Railroads 
favored the corporate form because it permitted them to raise the large 
amounts of capital that the business would require, while leaving the 
management of the firm in the hands of a small team of professionals.104  
In other words, the corporate form made it possible to separate a firm’s 
owners from its managers.  Indeed, the very features that made the 
corporate form unappealing to a closely held business made it well suited 
to the needs of a large, capital-intensive business that could not be 
supported solely by the wealth of its owner-managers.   
Initially, the largest firms took the form of trusts, not corporations.  
Such trusts arose during the 1880s when firms in the processing sector 
faced stiff price competition, leading companies in particular industries 
to search for a way to manage their activities on a coordinated basis.105  
The first consolidated enterprise to operate as a trust was Standard Oil, 
which was formed in 1879 under the leadership of John D. Rockefeller.106  
The trust was better suited than the corporation for this task at that time 
partly because state statutes did not permit corporations to own shares in 
other corporations.107  Nor could such firms operate across state lines.108  
Those limitations did not apply to a trust.  Trusts were not conceived as a 
device for obtaining capital from passive investors.  To the contrary, the 
owners of the trusts were typically the partners of the firms that comprised 
the trust.109  Thus, even when trusts emerged as a source of economic 
power, the owner-managed firm remained the dominant model, even for 
the largest industrial ventures.  However, over time, these large 
commercial enterprises would evolve into ones that were characterized 
by large numbers of passive owners and a small team of professional 
managers.   
The trend away from the owner-managed firm started during the 1880s 
when owners of trusts became interested in disposing of their shares.  The 
New York Stock Exchange accommodated them by allowing the trading 
of trust certificates on an unlisted basis.110  By the end of the 1880s, the 
trading volume was so high that the exchange eclipsed the Boston Stock 
Exchange as the country’s preeminent stock market.111  More importantly, 
 
 104. Hovenkamp, supra note 90, at 1595. 
 105. Navin & Sears, supra note 39, at 112.  
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Horwitz, supra note 89, at 191. 
 109. Navin & Sears, supra note 39, at 113.   
 110. Id. at 115. 
 111. Id.  
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from the 1880’s onward, securities of all types became an increasingly 
attractive investment vehicle and the ownership of business firms became 
more dispersed and mobile.  In short, the emergence of an organized 
securities market facilitated the gradual transition from an economy 
dominated by small owner-managed firms to one dominated by huge 
commercial enterprises with widely dispersed, passive investors. 
Meanwhile, the corporation became a more attractive way to conduct 
business on a large scale.  The key event occurred in 1889 when New 
Jersey amended its incorporation statute to permit corporations to own 
stock in other corporations.112  The amended statute also permitted 
incorporation for any lawful purpose, offering virtually unlimited 
flexibility to corporate managers.  Soon thereafter, other states followed 
suit.113   
The shift to the corporate form coincided with a shift in the 
management structure of the largest firms.  Those firms were traditionally 
managed by their owners.  However, firms gradually began to rely on 
passive investors for a portion of their equity capital.  The trend 
accelerated and intensified during the 1890s as a result of two factors.  
First, existing trusts and partnerships incorporated themselves, with the 
owners taking advantage of the developing market for industrial securities 
to liquidate part of their investment.  The usual pattern would be for the 
owners to issue common stock to themselves, while issuing nonvoting 
preferred stock to executives, employees, distributors and members of the 
general public.114  Second, there was an unparalleled wave of industrial 
combinations that occurred starting in the mid-1890s through 1904, a 
period referred to as the Merger Movement.115  The issuance of preferred 
stock was a key element of these transactions, too.116   
 Preferred stock had several attractive features.  First, it was a fixed 
income instrument that could be more easily priced than common stock 
by investors who had little knowledge of the issuer’s business.117  Second, 
compared to common stock, it was more acceptable to an investing public 
that was accustomed to the regular interest payments that would be paid 
on a bond.118  Meanwhile, preferred stock enabled the company to obtain 
needed capital in a less expensive and less risky way than by issuing debt 
 
 112. Horwitz, supra note 89, at 195. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Navin & Sears, supra note 39, at 120, 123. 
 115. NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895-
1904 (1985).  More than 1,800 firms disappeared into consolidations during this period.  Id. at 2. 
 116. Navin & Sears, supra note 39, at 122. 
 117. JONATHAN BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 
152 (1999). 
 118. Id. 
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or by borrowing money.119  Industrial proprietors and corporate managers 
liked issuing nonvoting preferred stock to new investors because that 
enabled them to liquidate part of their investment without endangering 
their position of control and their ability to exploit the company for their 
own personal objectives.120 By contrast, voting power seemed to have 
little value to small investors whose holdings were unlikely to be large 
enough to translate into a meaningful voice in corporate governance.121   
Bankruptcy risk was a third consideration.  Bankruptcies were common 
during this period, even among the largest U.S. corporations.  In that 
context, preferred stock gave managers greater control over payments to 
investors when financial conditions were not ideal.122  The popularity of 
preferred stock is significant in that its use permitted ownership and 
management of the largest corporations to become separate in fact, not 
just in theory.  
The net effect of these events caused the American economy to 
undergo a drastic transformation between 1890 and 1916.123  It began as 
a period dominated by owner-managed firms operating in largely 
unregulated competitive markets.  That was the context in which 
Congress adopted the uniform rules for taxing business profits.  By the 
end of 1916, the economy was dominated by relatively few large 
corporations with passive owners and professional managers operating in 
a regulated market. This different context led Congress to reconsider the 
merits of a uniform rule for taxing business profits. 
The distribution practices of publicly traded corporations also changed 
considerably over the years.  In the period preceding the First World War, 
it was the accepted practice for all firms to distribute nearly all of their 
earnings, no matter what the firm’s size or legal form.124  This had always 
been the universal norm for partnerships.125  Firms operating in corporate 
form observed the same practice for two principal reasons.126  First, those 
 
 119. Navin & Sears, supra note 39, at 116. 
 120. Id. at 116, 119 (1955); BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 117, at 153. 
 121. BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 117, at 153. 
 122. Id. at 155. 
 123. See MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-
1916 (1988). 
 124. ROBERT SOBEL, THE GREAT BULL MARKET: WALL STREET IN THE 1920S 32 (1968) (“Before 
the [First World] war, most large corporations considered earnings after taxes and payments to 
bondholders and preferred stockholders a “surplus,” and much of this was divided among the common 
stockholders.  This meant that such firms would have to depend heavily upon the capital markets for funds 
needed for expansion, and large bond issues were considered normal.”); Bank, supra note 36, at 473. 
 125. SHAW LIVERMORE, EARLY AMERICAN LAND COMPANIES: THEIR INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE 
DEVELOPMENT 232 (1939).  
 126. This was the case even though directors had considerable power to withhold payments to 
shareholders, and there were a variety of rules limiting shareholder access to profits.  For example, 
dividends had to be paid exclusively from the profits of the firm, as opposed to any funds contributed by 
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firms were simply not in the habit of disclosing financial information to 
anyone, as financial reporting of any kind did not start to occur until the 
twentieth century.127  That made the distributions of profits the principal, 
tangible way a firm could telegraph how well it was doing and to establish 
a value for its stock.128  Second, in the absence of dividends, there would 
be no way for someone to realize a return on an investment in corporate 
stock.129 Today, the existence of an organized stock market offers 
investors the option to sell their shares to someone else.  However, an 
organized and efficient stock market did not arise until well into the 
twentieth century.130  Therefore, companies that issued stock before that 
market arose had to observe liberal dividend policies in order to attract 
individuals to invest in a relatively illiquid asset.131 The emergence of an 
organized stock market gave firms the freedom to retain a greater share 
of their earnings and to distribute a smaller share to their investors.  Such 
a shift in distribution practices made it difficult to justify a tax policy that 
required the investor to pay tax on their share of a firm’s earnings that 
they did not actually receive and could not access.    
G. Evolving Legal Conceptions of the Firm 
Treating a firm as an extension of its owners—and not as a separate 
and distinct entity—was not a concept that was unique to tax law.  
Throughout most of the nineteenth century and beyond, business entities 
of all kinds were not viewed as having a legal identity apart from their 
owners.  This was especially true for partnerships, which consistently had 
been viewed as contractual arrangements that did not produce a separate 
and distinct legal entity.  Instead, the partnership was merely an 
aggregation of the partners.132   
The legal status of the corporation evolved over the years.  During the 
early part of the nineteenth century, the corporation was viewed as an 
 
the shareholders.  VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 435 at 
410 (2d ed. 1886).  Second, the board of directors possessed complete discretion to determine whether 
and when to pay a dividend.  Cyrus LaRue Munson, Dividends, 1 YALE L.J. 193, 196 (1891).       
 127. Bank, supra note 36, at 468-472. 
 128. Id. 
 129. BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 117, at 19. 
 130. A number of stock exchanges did exist during this period.  However, they were still evolving 
and handled a very narrow range of securities for an even more limited clientele.  ROBERT SOBEL, INSIDE 
WALL STREET: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE FINANCIAL DISTRICT 28-33 (1977).  In 1877, for 
example, there were only 163 stocks and 334 bonds listed for trading on the New York Stock Exchange, 
with most of them representing railroads, banks and local industries.  The Boston Stock Exchange 
overshadowed the NYSE for industrial securities.  Id. at 32. 
 131. Once the securities markets developed, the emphasis on dividends was replaced by a focus on 
earnings.  R.W. SHABACKER, STOCK MARKET THEORY AND PRACTICE 411-12 (1930).  
 132. Horwitz, supra note 89, at 181.  See also UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1914). 
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artificial entity.133  That was consistent with the observed reality.  Prior to 
1850, the only way to secure a corporate charter was through an act of the 
legislature.134  However, such special charters were severely criticized 
during the Jacksonian period for encouraging bribery and favoritism.135  
That criticism fueled a nationwide push for statutes that made the act of 
incorporation universally available.  By 1870, every state in the union had 
enacted such laws.   
The availability of so-called “free incorporation” called into question 
the idea of the corporation as an artificial entity.  The immediate response 
was to view a corporation as a contractual arrangement analogous to a 
partnership.136  In fact, around the time of the Civil War, the leading 
treatise on corporations described corporations as “little more than limited 
partnerships.”137  Moreover, through the 1880s, there was a strong 
tendency to analyze corporation law not much differently from the law 
governing partnerships.138  Because those rules embraced a view of the 
firm as an aggregation of individuals, all powers of the firm derived from 
the rights of the individuals who comprised it.139  This tendency to elevate 
the role of the individual may have partly reflected the anti-corporate and 
anti-consolidation bias that characterized the period.140 
Even though the law initially drew few distinctions between 
corporations and partnerships, legal theorists vigorously debated whether 
a corporation was a mere aggregation of individuals or whether it was 
indeed a real entity that was separate and distinct from the individuals 
who compose it.141  Perhaps the first prominent judicial decision that 
adopted the idea that a corporation was a separate legal entity came in 
1886, when the U.S. Supreme Court casually declared in Santa Clara 
County v. Southern Pacific Railroad that a corporation was a person under 
the Fourteenth Amendment and entitled to the protection granted by its 
provisions.142  The Court was hesitant to completely equate the status of 
corporations with that of individuals.  Instead, it conferred parity on a case 
by case basis in a series of decisions involving discrete constitutional 
rights.143 
 
 133. Horwitz, supra note 89, at 181. 
 134. Id. at 181. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 182. 
 137. JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
AGGREGATE, 766 (John Lathrop ed. 7th ed. 1861) (1832). 
 138. Horwitz, supra note 89, at 203-04. 
 139. Id. at 182. 
 140. Id. at 186. 
 141. Id. at 182, 185. 
 142. 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
 143. Horwitz, supra note 89, at 182. 
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In the interim, the entity theory gained momentum and the laws of 
partnerships and corporations moved in radically different directions.  
There are two particularly illuminating examples of this trend.  The first 
involved the level of shareholder approval required to undertake a major 
transaction.  Traditionally, it was necessary for a corporation to obtain 
unanimous shareholder consent to undertake a merger or other 
fundamental change.  The rule was one example of the tendency to view 
corporations as merely a contractual arrangement similar to a 
partnership.144  However, by the time of the Merger Movement at the turn 
of the century, nearly all states had passed statutes permitting such 
transactions to proceed with less than unanimous shareholder consent.145  
The common law rule of unanimous consent was also eroded by a 
consistent line of judicial decisions.  The combination of trends led one 
contemporary scholar to observe that by 1926, there was “hardly a state . 
. . where the dominant common law rule . . . ha[d] not been abrogated by 
statute or decision.”146 
In a similar fashion, views on the role of the directors shifted in a 
dramatic way.  Traditionally, the shareholders were considered to possess 
all the powers of the corporation, with the board acting as their agents and 
lacking any inherent power to appoint subagents.147  Such a view is 
consistent with the idea that the corporation is a contractual arrangement.  
By 1931, however, the leading treatise on the power of corporate directors 
reflected a dramatic change in legal opinion, explaining how modern 
decisions emphasized “the directors’ absolutism in the management of the 
affairs of large corporations.”148  This observation was consistent with the 
prevailing realities: in a world where corporations regularly merged and 
individuals held diversified portfolios of industrial securities, 
shareholders were no longer “co-entrepreneurs,” but merely passive 
investors.149 
Given the state and structure of business activity during most of the 
nineteenth century, it is easy to see why Congress adopted a uniform rule 
for taxing business profits as part of the nation’s first experiment with an 
income tax.  Virtually all firms were, in fact, managed by their owners, 
regardless of the legal form adopted by the business.  In the rare case 
where the firm did not meet this description, taxing the owners on their 
shares of a firm’s profits did not produce any distorted outcomes because 
firms, in fact, distributed all their earnings to their owners.  Moreover, 
 
 144. Id. at 200. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Joseph L. Weiner, Payment of Dissenting Stockholders, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 547 (1927). 
 147. ANGELL & AMES, supra note 137, at 257. 
 148. H. SPELMAN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF LAW GOVERNING CORPORATE DIRECTORS, 
4-5 (1931). 
 149. Id. 
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taxing firms in a uniform way was an extension of the law’s uniform 
views about the nature of business organizations.  However, that uniform 
legal status had to be reconsidered as the economy evolved to be 
dominated by huge industrial enterprises with widely dispersed passive 
owners and a small team of professional managers.  The tax rules had to 
be reconsidered to reflect that new reality, too.   
III. THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE MODERN INCOME TAX 
A. 1913: Congress Adopts Two Approaches for Taxing Business Profits 
The income tax adopted in 1913 contained, for the first time, two 
different approaches for taxing business profits. One approach applied to 
profits derived through a corporation; the other applied to the profits 
derived through all other business firms.  The legislation accomplished 
this through a system consisting of three separate taxes: a corporate tax, a 
normal tax on individuals, and a surtax on individuals.  The combination 
of rules interacted in such a way that the individual normal tax and surtax 
applied to the profits of any unincorporated firm.  The tax on corporate 
profits depended on whether the firm distributed the profits to its 
shareholders or not.  If the firm paid dividends to the owners, the tax on 
the profits were no different than if they were derived by a partnership or 
another unincorporated business.  However, any profits the firm did not 
distribute were only subject to the corporate tax.  
Individuals were subject to a normal tax and a surtax.150  The normal 
tax was a one percent flat tax on an individual’s net income in excess of 
an exempt amount.151  An individual’s net income would include his share 
of the profits of any partnership, whether those profits were distributed or 
not.152  However, net income did not include any corporate dividends.153  
Instead, all dividends and any undistributed corporate profits were subject 
to a one percent tax imposed on the corporation.154 Thus, the tax paid by 
a corporation was the functional substitute for the normal tax that would 
have been paid by the recipient of any dividend.155 The overall structure 
 
 150. Revenue Act of 1913, § II.A.2, 38 Stat. 114, 166.  
 151. Id. § II.A.1, 38 Stat. at 166. The exempt amount depended on a person’s marital status.  An 
unmarried individual was allowed to exclude the first $3,000 from the normal tax, while married couples 
were collectively allowed to exclude the first $4,000. Id. § II.C., 38 Stat. at 168.  
 152. Id. § II.D., 38 Stat. at 169.  
 153. Id. § II.B., 38 Stat. at 167.  
 154. The corporate tax applied to “every corporation, joint-stock company or association, and every 
insurance company, organized in the United States, no matter how created or organized, not including 
partnerships. . . .” Id. § II.G.(a), 38 Stat. at 172.  The Act’s corporate tax replaced a corporate excise tax 
that was in effect since 1909. 50 CONG. REC. 509 (statement of Rep. Hull) (1913).  
 155. However, because the normal tax only kicked in when an individual’s income exceeded the 
exempt amount, an individual whose income fell below that threshold would have been overtaxed on his 
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of the normal tax was very similar to the revenue measures enacted in the 
nineteenth century. 
Meanwhile, the surtax on individuals was a progressive tax that 
included a schedule of six rates ranging from one to six percent.156  The 
members of Congress broadly agreed on the overall structure of the surtax 
and how it should apply to individuals.157  However, lawmakers labored 
long and hard before adopting an approach for applying the surtax to 
business profits.158   
The application of the surtax to business profits was not expressly 
addressed in the original bill reported out of the House Ways and Means 
Committee and later passed by the full House.159  The Senate Finance 
Committee addressed the issue directly by amending the bill to include a 
provision that required an individual to pay surtax on his share of the 
profits of any business, whether incorporated or not, as long as the 
taxpayer would be “legally entitled to enforce the distribution or division 
of the same.”160  The drafters inserted this language out of an apparent 
concern that both partnerships and corporations would start reducing the 
amount of profits they distributed to their owners in an attempt to prevent 
those profits from being subject to the surtax.161   
 
share of any corporate profits.  
 156. The rates applied in a graduated way with the 1% tax applying to net income above $20,000 
and up to $50,000, while the 6% rate applied to amounts in excess $500,000.  Id. § II.A.2., 38 Stat. at 166.  
 157. The Senate Finance Committee did not recommend any changes to this aspect of the tax as 
proposed by the House Ways and Means Committee and adopted by the full House of Representatives. 
Compare S. REP. NO. 80 (1913) with H.R. REP. NO. 5 (1913).  
 158. Indeed, Senator Williams stated that it “gave us more trouble than anything” in the bill. 50 
CONG. REC. 5318 (1913).  
 159. See H. R. REP. NO. 5 (1913).  See also J. S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS:  1938-1861, 983-84 (1938). Indeed, the entire bill was relatively 
uncontroversial in the House where the Democrats held a large majority.  BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 
63, at 83.  
 160. SEIDMAN, supra note 159, at 983. This provision was adopted despite concerns voiced over 
the ability of individual shareholders to ascertain their share of a firm’s profits and the possibility that the 
amounts so taxed would be taxed again when distributed by the firm. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 63, 
at 86.  
 161. Senator Williams offered this explanation in response to a question raised by Senator Root on 
the floor of the Senate: 
 
That language, “if divided or distributed,” is somewhat awkward, and for that very reason we want 
it to go back to the committee; but the object of the amendment was this:  Here is a partnership, 
for example; the partners might make a very large amount of money, but they can effect an 
agreement whereby, instead of setting aside to each partner his income for that year, they allow it 
to go into the business, each partner to draw against the firm and make a showing of having no 
income at all from the partnership.  Then, it was thought that for the purpose of obtaining revenue 
a corporation might now and then pass up a portion of its profits to surplus or otherwise refrain 
from distributing them.  
 
50 CONG. REC. 3774 (1913) (statement of Sen. Williams).  The idea of taxing an individual on a portion 
of firm profits not actually received by him was not new.  The Revenue Act of 1864 set a precedent for 
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However, once the bill reached the floor of the Senate, lawmakers 
questioned the validity of permitting the undistributed profits of a 
corporation to be considered the income of any shareholder given that a 
shareholder had no power to force a corporation to pay a dividend.162  For 
that reason, the provision was sent back to the Committee for further 
consideration.163  The Committee modified the provision by requiring 
firm owners to pay surtax on their share of the undistributed earnings of 
a business only in those cases where the undistributed amounts were 
beyond the reasonable needs of the business.164  This approach seemed to 
acknowledge the emerging view that it was prudent for corporations to 
 
that.  Under that legislation, the profits of a business were expressly taxed to the individual owners, 
regardless of whether the business was incorporated and regardless of whether the profits were paid out 
to the owners.  Act of June 30, 1864, § 117, 13 Stat. at 282 (“[T]he gains and profits of all companies, 
whether incorporated or partnership . . . shall be included in estimating the annual gains, profits, or income 
of any person entitled to the same, whether divided or otherwise.”).  Under the interpretation of the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the amounts taxed to an individual included the undivided profits of 
a corporation.  See DIGEST OF DECISIONS AND REGULATIONS MADE BY THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL 
REVENUE, 1864-1898, at 16, 36, 37, 39, 40 (1906).  In dictum, the Supreme Court concurred with this 
interpretation in Collector v. Hubbard.  79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 1 (1870).  Taxing partnerships and corporations 
in the same way under a uniform rule seems to be consistent with the prevailing view about the nature of 
a partnership and a corporation.  At the time, both business forms were considered to be an aggregate of 
its owners.  See Kornhauser, supra note 70, at 58.  
 162. This seems to be clear from the following exchange between Senators Root and Williams on 
the floor of the Senate: 
 
Mr.  ROOT.  Mr.  President, before the amendment goes back to the committee, I desire to ask 
that the committee consider the question whether it is possible that the gains and profits referred 
to in this provision can be regarded as the income of the individual stockholder when they are not 
divided or distributed.  As I understand, this clause would have the effect of imposing an income 
tax on the aliquot share of each stockholder of a corporation in that part of the profits of the 
corporation for the year which might have been distributed but were not distributed.  
Mr.  WILLIAMS.  Not precisely that; but such part of the income of the partnership or corporation 
as a partnership or shareholder would have the legal right to force the distribution of . . . .  
Mr.  ROOT.  But taking it altogether, particularly considering the concluding words, I think it 
does aim to tax as income of the stockholder the profits of the corporation which are not divided . 
. .  I understand the law to be – I think it is the law in all of our States – that no stockholder has a 
right to demand a dividend from the profits of a corporation against the judgment of the directors 
or trustees of the corporation.  
 
50 CONG. REC. 3774 (1913) (statements of Sens.  Root and Williams).  There was little concern about the 
longstanding practice of taxing partners on their share of partnership profits.  This likely reflects the fact 
that by the time the Revenue Act of 1913 was under consideration, a partnership had generally come to 
be viewed as an extension of its owners, not as a separate entity.  See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 1914).   
 163. However, Senator Borah openly noted that if the committee decided not to apply the surtax to 
undistributed corporate profits, Congress would have to contend with reducing the risk that large estates 
would incorporate in order to escape the surtax.  50 CONG. REC. 3775 (1913) (statement of Sen.  Borah).  
 164. SEIDMAN, supra note 159, at 984.  Before deciding to limit the rule in this way, the Committee 
received the input of the Southern Railway Company, which cautioned against a rule that would put firms 
in the position of having to defend a decision to reinvest profits in the business.  See 50 CONG. REC. 4379 
(1913).  
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legitimately retain some portion of their annual earnings for future 
reinvestment.165  The Committee continued to draw no distinction 
between corporations and other businesses. Thus, the revised rule applied 
to both incorporated and unincorporated firms.166   
Additional language was added on the Senate floor to help clarify that 
the surtax would only reach those instances in which an intention to avoid 
tax motivated the decision not to distribute or divide the profits of the 
business. Specifically, owners would be taxed on their share of 
undistributed profits only when the companies (whether incorporated or 
not) were “formed or fraudulently availed of for the purpose of preventing 
the imposition of such [surtax] through the medium of permitting such 
gains and profits to accumulate.”167  Senator Williams explained the 
objective of the language: “It applies only to such profits and the heaping 
up of such surplus as shall justify the Secretary of the Treasury in 
concluding that it is done for the purpose of evading the tax. Its main 
purpose is to prevent the formation of holding companies.”168 
Under the compromise, the individual surtax would apply in two 
different ways depending on whether the profits were derived from an 
incorporated business or not.169  In the case of an unincorporated business, 
like a partnership, each owner would have to pay the surtax on his share 
of the profits of the business whether or not the share was actually 
distributed to the partner.170  This rule essentially replicated the approach 
taken for purposes of the normal tax.  However, if the business was a 
corporation, the conferees took a two-pronged approach.  First, each 
shareholder was required to pay surtax on any corporate profits actually 
distributed to him as a dividend.171  Second, the shareholders would also 
 
 165. Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-In Theory of the Corporate Income Tax, 94 GEO. L.J. 889, 
918 (2006).  
 166. SEIDMAN, supra note 159, at 983.   
 167. SEIDMAN, supra note 159, at 984; BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 63, at 92.  
 168. 50 CONG. REC. 4380 (1913) (statement of Sen. Williams).  The Senate Finance Committee’s 
adoption of a uniform rule for taxing the undistributed profits of partnerships and corporations seems odd. 
Elsewhere in the legislation, the Committee specified that the partners of a partnership (but not the 
shareholders of a corporation) would have to pay tax on their share of firm profits, whether distributed or 
not.  50 CONG. REC. 3855 (1913) (“Provided further, That any persons carrying on business in partnership 
shall be liable for income tax only in their individual capacity, and the share of the profits of a partnership 
to which any taxable partner would be entitled if the same were divided, whether divided or otherwise, 
shall be returned for taxation and the tax paid, under the provisions of this section, .  .  . ”).  In any event, 
the bill was reconciled in the Conference Committee, which revised the legislation to prevent the surtax 
from having two inconsistent rules for taxing undistributed partnership profits. 
 169. SEIDMAN, supra note 159, at 983-84.  
 170. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II.D., 38 Stat. 114, 169 (“Provided further, That any persons 
carrying on business in partnership shall be liable for income tax only in their individual capacity, and the 
share of the profits of a partnership to which any taxable partner would be entitled if the same were 
divided, whether divided or otherwise, shall be returned for taxation and the tax paid, under the provisions 
of this section, .  .  . ”).  
 171. But cf. id. § II.B., 38 Stat. at 167 (allowing an individual to exclude dividends from taxable 
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have to pay surtax on their share of any profits that were not distributed 
if the corporation’s failure to do so was motivated by a desire to prevent 
the application of the surtax.172   
This latter provision has become known as the “accumulated earnings 
penalty.” It was distinctive in part because it was not self-executing. 
Instead, the government had to detect cases of unlawful conduct and 
assess the tax. When it did, the government would have to establish that 
the failure to distribute profits was motivated by the desire to avoid tax.173  
However, by the terms of the legislation, the mere fact that the gains and 
profits were permitted to accumulate and become surplus was not to be 
construed as evidence of a purpose to escape the surtax unless the 
Secretary of the Treasury certified that such accumulation was 
“unreasonable for the purposes of the business.”174  Thus, only certain 
instances of undistributed surplus would be the target of the penalty based 
on the theory that there were certain legitimate accumulations of surplus 
that could be distinguished from illegitimate accumulations. However, 
Congress left it to the Secretary of the Treasury to draw these distinctions. 
In any year that the penalty tax applied, the noncompliant firm was taxed 
similar to a partnership for purposes of the surtax, with the shareholders 
having to pay tax both on amounts they actually received and their share 
of any undistributed profits for the year.175   
 
income for purposes of the normal tax only).  
 172. Id. § II. A.2., 38 Stat. at 166 (“For the purpose of [the surtax] the taxable income of any 
individual shall embrace the share to which he would be entitled of the gains and profits, if divided or 
distributed, whether divided or distributed or not, of all corporations, joint-stock companies, or 
associations however created or organized, formed or fraudulently availed of for the purpose of preventing 
the imposition of such tax through the medium of permitting such gains and profits to accumulate instead 
of being divided or distributed . . . . ”).  
 173. The Act identified two factors that could independently be relied upon as prima facie evidence 
of a fraudulent purpose to escape the surtax.  First, if the corporation was a mere holding company, that 
would constitute such prima facie evidence.  Second, the fact that the corporation permitted its gains and 
profits to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business would also constitute such prima facie 
evidence.  Id. § II.A.2., 38 Stat. at 167.  
 174. Id.   
 175. It would be incorrect to say that the firm and its shareholders were treated in a way that was 
identical to a partnership and its partners.  A partner was not taxed on amounts actually received by the 
partnership.  Rather, a partner was taxed solely on the partner’s share of profits derived by the partnership 
in a given year, while any actual distributions were tax free to the partner.  By contrast, under the rules of 
the accumulated earnings tax, a shareholder remained subject to tax on any profits actually received from 
the corporation as a dividend.  If in a later year, such a dividend consisted of amounts that were previously 
taxed to the shareholder under the accumulated earnings tax, that dividend would remain subject to tax.  
There was no provision exempting such a dividend from the surtax.  To that extent, the tax seems to 
operate as a penalty.  However, writing at a more contemporaneous time, one scholar concluded that the 
provision was “not, strictly speaking, a penalty statute.”  Lucius A. Buck and Francis Shackelford, 
Retention of Earnings by Corporations Under the Income Tax Laws, 36 VA. L. REV. 141, 153 (1950).  It 
is important to note that this particular scholar reached this conclusion without considering whether 
shareholders would be taxed on dividends consisting of profits that were previously taxed to them under 
the accumulated earnings rules in prior years.  The one penal quality he did identify was the fact that the 
“surtax” would apply to amounts “the corporation could have accumulated to meet its reasonable needs.”  
28
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss1/1
2019] A TAX THEORY OF THE FIRM 29 
In the end, the rules for taxing business profits created an incentive for 
individuals to utilize corporations as a tax shelter.  While all partnership 
profits were subject to as much as seven percent in tax, corporate profits 
would be subject to that rate only when they were actually distributed to 
shareholders.  Corporate profits that were retained by the firm were only 
subject to the one percent corporate tax.   
Congress granted tax relief to undistributed corporate earnings for two 
reasons.  First, it did not want to make individual shareholders pay surtax 
when the shareholder was not in a position to effectively access the 
earnings.  Second, Congress did not want a tax to influence decisions 
about ways to finance corporate investments.  A tax on undistributed 
corporate profits would have discouraged firms from relying on such 
funds at a time when it was considered to be a responsible and prudent 
practice to retain such earnings and not to pay all profits out as a dividend.  
Thus, the unique way of taxing corporations was designed to 
accommodate a specific business structure:  a firm whose managers could, 
and did, deploy the firm’s earnings in a way that served the interests of 
the firm.   
Despite the sound rationale for taxing corporate profits in a unique 
way, Congress understood how this unequal system of taxation could be 
abused. Lacking a sufficiently precise test to distinguish between 
impermissible and permissible cases of undistributed profits, Congress 
essentially delegated the task to the Internal Revenue Service with 
instructions to inquire into the taxpayer’s intent.  
The was not an easy one for the Treasury to execute.  Part of the 
Treasury’s difficulties can be traced to the inherent complexities in 
enforcing a rule that required establishing taxpayer intent. Its difficulties 
also stemmed from the fact that the disparity in the taxation of 
undistributed corporate profits and other business profits grew larger over 
time, increasing the incentive for firms to retain earnings beyond 
permissible levels.176  The government was simply ill-equipped to 
respond to taxpayer efforts to avoid the surtax. As explained in the next 
section, Congress made a variety of adjustments to the accumulated 
earnings penalty in order to improve its effectiveness, but the provision 
 
Id. By that measure, however, it would seem that the approach for taxing partnerships also had a penal 
quality, since—under those rules—partners were not relieved of surtax on their share of partnership profits 
retained by the firm to meet its reasonable needs. As a matter of Congressional intent, however, the 
legislative history for the 1913 Act contains no evidence that lawmakers consciously intended a double 
tax to apply. In fact, Congress affirmatively rejected such an idea five years later when it revised the 
accumulated earnings tax. Those amended rules expressly exempt from the surtax future distributions of 
amounts that were previously taxed to shareholders. There is no evidence that the change was motivated 
by a desire to ease the burden of the tax. To the contrary, as later sections of this Article will illustrate, 
Congress consistently tried to strengthen it.   
 176. Richard Winchester, Parity Lost: The Price of a Corporate Tax in a Progressive Tax World, 9 
NEV. L.J. 130 (2008).  
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consistently proved to be an ineffective tool to address tax evasion.  
B. 1918: The Government Can Explicitly Tax Certain Corporations Like 
Partnerships 
Five years after enacting the accumulated earnings tax, Congress 
adjusted the remedy provided by the law. Under the revised version of the 
tax, the corporate income tax simply would not apply to any corporation 
that fraudulently accumulated earnings. Instead, the shareholders had to 
pay tax on their share of firm profits as if they were members of a 
partnership.177  Thus, both the normal tax and the surtax would apply to 
each shareholder’s share of firm profits, whether the taxpayer received 
any or not.178  In other words, the remedy emphatically treated the 
corporation as a partnership.  This change effectively declared that any 
corporation falling within the scope of the statute should not be respected 
as such. 
 C. 1921: Certain Corporations Can Choose to be Taxed Like 
Partnerships 
By 1921, Congress had to reconsider the remedy imposed under the 
accumulated earnings tax in light of a 1920 Supreme Court decision that 
cast doubt on the constitutionality of taxing shareholders on the 
undistributed profits of a corporation.179  In response, Congress replaced 
the shareholder tax with a 25 percent tax on the corporation.180  Under the 
1921 Act, all corporations were subject to a 12.5 percent corporate tax,181 
 
 177. The statute specifically required the firm to be subject to a newly enacted set of rules that 
applied to so-called personal service corporations.  Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 220, 40 Stat. 1057, 
1072.  Under those rules, the shareholders had to pay tax on their share of firm profits as if they were 
members of a partnership.  Id.  § 218(e), 40 Stat. at 1070.  For a more complete description of the personal 
service corporation rules, see Richard Winchester, Corporations That Weren’t: The Taxation of Firm 
Profits in Historical Perspective, S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 501, 518-20 (2010).  
 178. The application of the rule appeared to be quite cumbersome.  The Treasury declared in an 
early pronouncement that “[w]hether a corporation is taxable under section 220 can not be determined in 
advance; it must be determined at a later date in the light of what it has actually done with the profits 
retained.”  T.B.M. 2, 1 C.B. 181 (1919).  The implication is that the corporation and its shareholders would 
report income and pay tax as if the provision did not apply.  If the government determined that the 
provision did apply, then adjustments would have to be made at both the firm level and the shareholder 
level to conform to reverse the original treatment and to conform to partnership treatment.    
 179. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).  The Eisner Court concluded that a shareholder 
could not be taxed on the value of a dividend paid in the form of stock in the dividend paying corporation.  
H.R. REP. NO. 67-350, at 12-13 (1921); S. REP. NO. 67-275, at 16 (1921).  Prior to the decision in Eisner, 
the practice of taxing shareholders on their share of a corporation’s undistributed profits was never directly 
tested in the courts. See Harry J. Rudick, Section 102 and Personal Holding Company Provisions of the 
Internal Revenue Code, 49 YALE L. J. 171, 174 and note 18 (1939) (discussing cases). 
 180. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 220, 42 Stat. 227, 247.  
 181. Id. § 230, 42 Stat. at 252.  
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which meant that a total of 37.5 percent in tax would be imposed on 
undistributed corporate earnings when the accumulated earnings penalty 
applied.182 
As an alternative to the 25 percent corporate tax, the 1921 Act 
permitted the government to waive the accumulated earnings penalty if 
the shareholders agreed to be taxed on their share of firm profits as if the 
firm were a partnership.183  This election was only available when the 
government determined that the corporation had unlawfully accumulated 
profits.184  Here again, the changes made to the accumulated earnings tax 
continued to reflect the idea that not all corporations are the same and 
some behave in ways that would require taxing the firm as a partnership, 
not a corporation.  However, the line dividing those firms from all the 
others remained vague and elusive, a continued sign of Congressional 
ambivalence about its approach. 
D. 1924: Congress Repeals the Option to Tax Certain Corporations 
Like Partnerships 
In 1924, Congress eliminated the aforementioned election for a 
corporation to be treated like a partnership.185  In that year, lawmakers 
were acutely aware that the accumulated earnings tax did not have a very 
good track record of discouraging tax avoidance.186  This time, however, 
 
 182. In addition, in the even the firm distributed the earnings in future years, the shareholders would 
have had to pay a surtax of up to 50 percent on the dividends.  Id. § 211(a)(2), 42 Stat. at 235-37.  Although 
that was significant, it was still lower than the total tax imposed on corporate dividends and partnership 
profits. Under the 1921 Act, corporate dividends were taxed as high as 77.5 percent, while partnership 
profits were taxed as high as 73 percent. The 77.5% tax on corporate dividends consisted of the corporate 
tax and the individual surtax. Id. § 230, 42 Stat. 227, 252 (12.5% corporate tax); id. § 211(a)(2), 42 Stat. 
at 235-37 (individual surtax up to 65%). The 73% tax on partnership profits consisted of the normal tax 
and the surtax on individuals.  Id. § 210, 42 Stat. at 233 (normal tax up to 8%); id. § 211(a)(2), 42 Stat. at 
235-37 (individual surtax up to 65%).   
 183. Id. § 220, 42 Stat. at 247-48.  This procedure would apply only if the shareholders unanimously 
agreed to it and if the Commissioner also consented. Id.   
 184. Id. § 220, 42 Stat. at 248.  
 185. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 220(a), 43 Stat. 253, 277.  
 186. During the floor debates on the 1924 Act, Senator George Norris of Nebraska observed that 
the use of corporations to evade surtax was a routine device for evading the surtax:   
 
Everybody knows that it is quite common for men to escape taxation on incomes from Liberty 
bonds by organizing corporations really for the purpose of holding those Liberty bonds, and thus 
escaping the surtaxes they would have to pay if they owned them individually.   
 
65 CONG. REC. 7359 (1924) (statement of Sen.  Norris).  The minority report of the Senate Finance 
Committee expressed its frustrations this way:   
 
It is true a penalty against the organization of a corporation for the sole purpose of evading taxation 
is included in the present law and increased in the proposed bill.  In actual result, however, such 
penalty provision has been and will be for all practical purposes a nullity.  The penalty of the 
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the congressional response was to increase the penalty tax payable by the 
corporation to fifty percent, a level that was considered high enough to 
adequately deter any excessive retention of profits because it far exceeded 
the tax that would otherwise apply.187  Under the 1924 Act, all 
undistributed corporate profits remained subject to a 12.5 percent 
corporate tax.188 Meanwhile, corporate dividends were taxed as high as 
52.5 percent189 and  a tax of up to 46 percent was imposed on partnership 
profits.190  A 50 percent penalty on top of a 12.5 percent corporate tax 
would have resulted in a total tax that exceeded the tax burden on either 
corporate dividends or partnership profits.  
In that respect, the 1924 Act was different from its predecessors. Under 
the prior revenue laws, whenever a firm fell within the scope of the 
accumulated earnings tax, the rules effectively taxed the corporation’s 
profits as if they were derived by a partnership. That was no longer true 
under the 1924 Act. However, as will be evident in the following sections, 
it was not long before Congress returned to its habit of simply treating a 
corporation’s profits as if they were derived by a partnership. 
E. 1926: Shareholders Have the Option to Pay Tax on Undistributed 
Corporate Earnings 
Under the Revenue Act of 1926, Congress retained the fifty percent 
penalty that could be imposed on any corporation that fell within the 
scope of the accumulated earnings tax.191  However, Congress also 
allowed firms to protect themselves from any exposure to the penalty if 
all of the shareholders paid tax on their share of the firm’s undistributed 
profits as a constructive dividend.192  Subsequent distributions of amounts 
 
present law has only been applied in one or two cases.  The Secretary testified before the 
committee that corporations were not being availed of so as to result in a decrease in taxation.  
Before another committee of the Senate, a prominent attorney from the city of New York testified 
that such was generally being done.  We believe that so long as the inducements exist in the law 
they will be availed of by interested taxpayers.  
 
S. REP. NO. 68-398, pt. 2, at 9 (1924).  
 187. S. REP. NO. 67-275, at 26 (1921).  
 188. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 230, 43 Stat. 253, 282.  The Senate passed a measure that 
would have imposed an additional tax on a corporation’s undistributed earnings.  65 CONG. REC. 8033 
(1924).  However, that proposal was eliminated from the bill reported by the Conference Committee.  H.R. 
REP. NO. 68-844, at 21 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 300, 305.  See also Bank, supra note 36, at 503-
04.  
 189. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 230, 43 Stat. 253, 282. (12.5% corporate tax); id. § 1200, 43 
Stat. at 353 (individual surtax up to 40%).  
 190. Id. § 210(a), 43 Stat. at 264 (normal tax up to 6%); id. § 1200, 43 Stat. at 353 (individual surtax 
up to 40%).  
 191. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 220(a), 44 Stat. 9, 34.  
 192. Id. § 220(e), 44 Stat. at 34-35.  
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that were previously taxed to the shareholder under this rule were 
expressly exempt from the shareholder’s normal tax and any surtax.193 In 
the event a firm’s shareholders did not elect to pay tax on their share of 
the firm’s profits, the fifty percent penalty would have been a significant 
price to pay compared to the alternatives. Under the Act, corporate 
dividends were subject to an aggregate tax of up to 33.5 percent,194 while 
the tax on partnership profits was as high as 25 percent.195   
The option for shareholders to pay tax on a constructive dividend was 
distinctive from its predecessor in two important respects.  First, the 
option was available to any corporation; it was not limited to those that 
the Treasury had already accused of failing to distribute sufficient 
earnings to shareholders.196 Second, under this option, the firm’s earnings 
were subject to both the corporate tax and the shareholder tax on 
dividends, which essentially respected the firm as a separate and distinct 
entity.  By contrast, the existing rule simply treated the firm as if it were 
a partnership and eliminated the tax at the firm level.  This option to 
pretend that the firm paid a dividend remained available to taxpayers until 
1938.197 It was an example of another congressional attempt to disregard 
legal formalities in order to ensure that the rules for taxing business profits 
applied in a coherent way.  
This historical review shows that during the formative years of the 
modern income tax, Congress felt constrained by two concerns:  (1) the 
desire not to penalize firms that set aside earnings as part of a prudent 
practice to finance future investments, and (2) the inequity of taxing 
undistributed earnings to shareholders who simply could not access them.  
In later years, the need to resolve these tensions became more pressing, 
leading Congress to experiment with objective ways to measure whether 
a corporation should be taxed as such.  
 
 193. Id. Interestingly, this provision was added to the bill by the Senate Finance Committee, which, 
in 1924 removed a similar measure from the revenue bill. Under that rejected measure, if the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue concluded that a corporation had been availed of in order to evade the 
individual surtax, the shareholders could have elected (with the Commissioner’s consent) to be taxed on 
their respective shares of the corporation’s net income for the year. See text accompanying note 183.  Such 
an election would have been a substitute for the corporate penalty tax.  
 194. Id. § 230(a)(2), 44 Stat. at 39 (13.5% corporate tax); id. § 211(a), 44 Stat. at 22-23 (maximum 
20% tax on dividends).  
 195. Id. § 210, 44 Stat. at 21 (maximum 20% normal tax); id. § 211(a), 44 Stat. at 22-23 (maximum 
20% surtax).  
 196. Id. § 220(e), 44 Stat. at 34.  
 197. See Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 104(d), 45 Stat. 791, 815; Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, 
§104(d), 47 Stat. 169, 195; Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 102(d), 48 Stat. 680, 702; Revenue Act of 
1936, ch. 690, § 102(d), 49 Stat. 1648, 1677. In its place, the 1938 Act permitted the penalty to be 
determined after reducing the firm’s undistributed earnings by “consent dividends,” which were amounts 
of undistributed earnings that the shareholders agreed to include in their taxable incomes. See Harry J. 
Rudick, Section 102 and Personal Holding Company Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, 49 YALE 
L.J. 171, 180 (1939).  
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IV. EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF THE CONCENTRATION OF 
OWNERSHIP PRINCIPLE 
Unsatisfied with its subjective approach for dealing with tax avoidance 
opportunities created by the inconsistent way of taxing business profits, 
Congress began to consider legislation that utilized a more objective 
mechanism for policing abuse of the corporate form. That process began 
in 1928 and culminated with the 1938 personal holding company rules. 
A. 1928: The Concentration of Ownership Principle First Appears in 
Legislation 
The first tax legislation to include an objective method for 
distinguishing corporations appeared in 1928.  Congress ultimately 
decided to retain the accumulated earnings penalty adopted in 1926.  
However, that only occurred after lawmakers devoted time considering 
an alternative that would serve as the template for future legislation that 
eventually got signed into law. 
That process began when Congress authorized a Joint Committee to 
investigate the administration of the tax laws.198  That Committee 
produced a report that documented the Treasury’s track record of 
enforcing the accumulated earnings tax.199  The chairman of the 
Committee, Representative William Green of Iowa, described the 
creation and use of corporations to avoid the surtax as “the most fruitful 
method of tax evasion.”200  Indeed, by one estimate, the government was 
deprived of $168 million between 1922 and 1925 as a result of 
corporations that were used to accumulate earnings and prevent the 
imposition of the surtax.201  Despite this reality, the Treasury Department 
had pursued very few cases and had not collected one dollar in revenue 
as a result of their efforts.202  The agency offered two explanations for its 
performance.  First, it was the agency’s position that an investment 
company had an unlimited need for accumulated profits. In addition, the 
agency had a policy not to pursue closely held corporations whenever 
such firms had invested their surplus earnings in expansion or the 
acquisition of other businesses.203  These positions were surprising 
because they effectively exempted from tax precisely the cases that 
 
 198. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27 § 1203, 44 Stat. 9, 127-28.  
 199. Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue Tax’n, 69th CONG., DIV. OF INVESTIGATION, vol. 1 – pt.  3, 
REP. ON EVASION OF SURTAXES BY INCORPORATION (SECTION 220) (Comm. Print 1927) (hereinafter 
1927 Tax Evasion Report).  
 200. WILLIAM RAYMOND GREEN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN TAXATION 114 (1933).  
 201. Id. at 116 (citing NATIONAL INCOME TAX MAGAZINE, Apr. 1927). 
 202. 1927 Tax Evasion Report, supra note 199, at 38.  
 203. Id. at 33-34.  
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Congresses intended to reach when it adopted the provision.204  Indeed, 
from the very beginning, a corporation’s status as an investment company 
or holding company was prima facie evidence of an intent to evade the 
surtax. In order to rectify the situation, the report concluded that Congress 
might consider replacing the existing provision with one that operates 
“more automatically.”205   
In 1928, the Committee on Ways and Means reported a bill that 
addressed corporate tax shelters in two separate ways. First, the bill 
reduced the existing accumulated earnings tax from 50 percent to 25 
percent, reasoning that the existing penalty was unduly harsh.206  Second, 
the bill added a new provision targeted at so-called personal holding 
companies.207 Under the proposed rules, a corporation would have to pay 
a 25 percent tax whenever its undistributed earnings exceeded a certain 
threshold and the firm satisfied a net income test and an ownership test.208  
The net income test was satisfied whenever the firm derived at least 80 
percent of its net income from certain passive sources.209 The ownership 
test was met whenever ten or fewer individuals directly or indirectly 
owned at least 80 percent of the company’s voting power or value.210  The 
Committee believed that this class of corporations was most likely to 
accumulate surplus in order to evade individual surtaxes on corporate 
earnings.211  
Although the Committee viewed the provision as a tool to combat the 
use of corporations to avoid the individual surtax, it is not clear what may 
have informed the specific approach it decided to take. The income test 
seems to be influenced by the 1927 report, but the origin of the ownership 
test is a bit of a mystery.  The Committee proposal focuses on 
concentration of ownership. That idea is not reflected in any witness 
testimony. Nor does it appear to be supported by any research or study, 
including the 1927 report.  Six years earlier, the British enacted a rule to 
address the use of corporations to avoid tax.212  That legislation employed 
a concentration of ownership test to identify the firms that fell within the 
 
 204. Id. at 36. The statute always declared that it would be prima facie evidence of a purpose to 
escape the surtax if a corporation were a mere holding company. See Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 6, § 
II(A)(2), 38 Stat. 114, 167.  Starting in 1924, being an investment company had the same effect. See 
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 220(b), 43 Stat. 253, 277.  
 205. 1927 Tax Evasion Report, supra note 199, at 54.  
 206. H.R. REP. NO. 70-2, at 18 (1927).  
 207. Id. at 17-18.  
 208. Id. The tax applied if the undistributed earnings exceeded 30 percent of the amount consisting 
of the firm’s net income, dividends and tax-free interest.   
 209. Id.  
 210. Id. at 17.  
 211. Id.  
 212. Finance Act 1922 § 21 (12 & 13 Geo.) ch. 17 (U.K). 
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scope of the law.  However, that test required five or fewer persons to 
possess a majority of the voting power or shares in the company.213  So, 
if the Committee was influenced by the English approach, that influence 
appears to have been limited to embracing the general concentration of 
ownership principle.214  The Committee adopted its own formula to 
implement the principle.  Whatever the rationale for the personal holding 
company rules, they apparently responded to a concern that was of great 
interest to the general public. The New York Times saw fit to run a page 
one article that contained the actual text of the proposed personal holding 
company bill as passed by the Committee.215   
Members of the House reacted positively to the personal holding 
company proposal, viewing it as both a way to address the Treasury’s 
failure to enforce the accumulated earnings penalty tax, and as an 
effective way to single out firms that were merely a front for their 
owners.216  Nevertheless, there were still lingering questions about 
whether the provisions were sufficiently tailored to not apply to firms that 
were not mere vehicles to avoid the surtax.217    
The House accepted the personal holding company proposal without 
objection.218  Members of the Senate, on the other hand, stressed the 
shortcomings of using a bright line rule, criticizing it as an “arbitrary” and 
“inflexible” approach that would penalize some firms that were observing 
sound and legitimate business practices.219  The Finance Committee 
stressed that the need for the rule was declining since the disparity 
between the individual and corporate tax rates was shrinking, reducing 
the incentive to utilize corporations as a tax shelter.220  The Finance 
Committee also believed that certain changes made to the accumulated 
earnings tax in 1924 and 1926 made it easier to administer, as evidenced 
 
 213. Id. § 21(6). 
 214. The English were a source of inspiration for other aspects of U.S. tax law.  The practice of 
collecting tax at its source was an idea that American lawmakers borrowed from the British.  Blakey, 
supra note 63, at 78-79; Ajay K. Mehrotra, “From Contested Concept to Cornerstone of Administrative 
Practice”:  Social Learning and the Early History of U.S. Tax Withholding, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 144, 153-
155 (2016). 
 215. Tax Bill Reported Promptly to House, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1927, at 1.  
 216. 69 CONG. REC. 519 (1927) (statement of Rep. Garner); Id. at 521 (statement of Rep. Green). 
 217. Id. at 520 (statement of Rep. Green). 
 218. Id. at 518-21. 
 219. S. REP. NO. 70-960, at 12 (1928). Those objections were similar to those made during the floor 
debates in the House and the Senate.  It was also consistent with the views of certain individuals who 
testified at the hearings.  Representatives of the National Association of Real Estate Boards criticized the 
lines drawn by the ownership test because they penalized the actions of ten shareholders, while not 
penalizing the same actions of eleven shareholders. Treadway Demands Revised Tax Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr.  13, 1928, at 10.  The real estate lobby was among the interest groups to insist that Congress reject 
the proposal. Long Island Board Endorses Tax Brief, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1928, at 176.  See also, 69 
CONG. REC. 7976-77 (1928) (statements of Sen. Simmons and Sen. King). 
 220. S. REP. NO. 70-960, at 12.  
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by the fact that the Treasury seemed to be imposing the tax in a greater 
number of cases.221  Indeed, the report produced by the Joint Committee 
showed that enforcement increased dramatically in 1925 and 1926.222 The 
higher level of enforcement may also reflect some pressure that the 
Treasury Department received from Chairman Green.223   
The House yielded to the Senate when the bills were reconciled by the 
Conference Committee.224  Two factors may explain why the personal 
holding company rules did not survive. First, Chairman Green indicated 
in later years that it was always difficult to enact legislation directed at 
combating tax avoidance because many members of Congress were 
simply opposed to the income tax itself.225  Resistance in the Senate may 
have been particularly strong because the rules encountered opposition 
from organized wealth. 226  In addition, by the time the bill was referred 
to the Conference Committee, Representative William Green himself had 
been appointed to the U.S. Court of Claims. Not only did he chair both 
the Joint Committee and the House Committee on Ways and Means, the 
personal holding company rules were his brainchild.227  His absence may 
have deprived the rules of their most articulate advocate. Indeed, he was 
very frustrated by the Treasury Department’s failure to enforce the 
accumulated earnings tax and even threatened to bring Department 
officials before Congress.228   
Whatever the reasons, Congress declined to employ a more objective 
and meaningful way to distinguish corporations whose undistributed 
earnings were entitled to tax relief from those that were not.  Although 
the bill did not pass, reaction to it showed that a growing number of 
members were prepared to reject the fiction that shareholders never have 
the power to force a distribution, at least in the context of the closely held 
corporation.  
B. 1934: Congress Reduces the Concentration of Ownership Principle 
to an Objective Formula 
In 1934, Congress enacted rules that contained an objective method of 
 
 221. Id. Presumably those changes included the fact that the agency had to start treating as prima 
facie evidence of a tax avoidance purpose the fact that the firm was an investment company.  That was 
always the case for holding companies.   
 222. 1927 Tax Evasion Report, supra note 199, at 38. The Bureau of Internal Revenue assessed the 
tax 52 times between 1919 and 1926. Forty-one of those assessments were for the last two years.   
 223. 75 CONG. REC. 6979 (1932) (statement of Rep. LaGuardia).  
 224. H. REP. NO. 70-1882, at 14 (1928).  
 225. GREEN, supra note 200, at 115.  
 226. 75 CONG. REC. 6979 (1932).  
 227. Id. at 6978-79 (statement of Rep. LaGuardia).  
 228. Id. at 6979 (statement of Rep. LaGuardia).  
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identifying corporations whose undistributed profits would not be taxed 
under the rules that ordinarily applied to corporations.  The rules were 
included in the Revenue Act of 1934 as a completely new tax regime that 
applied in place of the accumulated earnings penalty tax whenever a 
corporation qualified as a personal holding company.229  In order to so 
qualify, the company  could not be a bank or trust company and it had to 
satisfy a gross income test and an ownership test.230  A corporation passed 
the gross income test if at least eighty percent of its gross income for the 
year consisted of certain passive items of income, like dividends and 
interest.231  A corporation passed the ownership test if five or fewer 
individuals owned (directly or indirectly) over fifty percent of the value 
of the corporation’s outstanding stock at any time during the last half of 
the year.232  If a corporation satisfied these two tests, it had to pay a thirty 
percent surtax on the first $100,000 of any “undistributed adjusted net 
income,” and a forty percent surtax on any undistributed amounts in 
excess of $100,000.233  This surtax took the place of the shareholder level 
tax that would have been triggered had the firm actually paid a dividend.  
If a corporation did not qualify as a personal holding company, it 
remained exposed to the accumulated earnings tax.234  However, neither 
tax would apply in any year all the shareholders voluntarily included in 
their gross income a fictional dividend representing their share of the 
corporation’s net income for the year.235  In those cases, the shareholders 
would not be taxed on the receipt of any actual dividend consisting of 
these previously taxed amounts.236   
The personal holding company rules were part of a larger effort to 
increase revenues by preventing tax avoidance, thereby eliminating the 
need to increase tax rates.237  The rules accomplished this objective by 
operating “automatically,” without the need for the government to 
establish a taxpayer’s intent to avoid tax.238  By one conservative estimate, 
personal holding companies caused the government to lose more than $1 
 
 229. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277 § 351(a), 48 Stat. 680, 751.   
 230. Id. § 351(b)(1), 48 Stat. 751.  
 231. Id. § 351(b)(1)(A), 48 Stat. 751.  
 232. Id. § 351(b)(1)(B), 48 Stat. 751. An attribution rule caused certain members of a family to 
count as one individual for these purposes. Id. § 351(b)(1)(C)-(E), 48 Stat. 751-52.  
 233. Id. § 351(a), 48 Stat. 751.  
 234. Id. § 102(a), 48 Stat. 702. Congress reduced the penalty from 50% to 25% because a 50% tax 
would have exceeded the tax that would have been imposed on an actual distribution, making it difficult 
for the provision to be readily enforceable. H. REP. NO. 73-704, at 12 (1934). 
 235. Id. § 351(d), 48 Stat. 752.   
 236. Id.  
 237. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 63, at 356.  
 238. H. REP. NO. 73-704, at 12 (1934). The rules were expected to generate $25 million in revenue 
each year. PREVENTION OF TAX AVOIDANCE, infra note 242 at 8.  
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billion in tax over the years prior to the enactment of this new rule.239   
Although the personal holding company rules were foreshadowed by 
the 1928 proposal, they were specifically the product of a Ways and 
Means subcommittee240 whose charge was to investigate a wide range of 
tax evasion techniques and to propose solutions.241  The subcommittee 
considered personal holding companies as the most prevalent form of tax 
avoidance practiced by wealthy individuals.242  Referring to the technique 
as the incorporated pocketbook, the report described this form of tax 
avoidance like this: “[A]n individual ‘forms a corporation and exchanges 
for its stock his personal holdings in stock, bonds, or other income-
producing property. By this means the income from the property pays 
corporation tax, but no surtax is paid by the individual if the income is not 
distributed.’”243  The subcommittee sought to target the most obvious and 
noncontroversial cases with an objective test that applied automatically, 
while allowing the Internal Revenue Service to use its judgment to assert 
penalties under the accumulated earning tax in situations that were not as 
clear cut.244   
The subcommittee’s proposal was structured in much the same way as 
the 1928 proposal in that it contained three principal elements: (1) a gross 
income test, (2) an ownership test, and (2) a formula for computing the 
tax. The gross income test was not modified from the one proposed in 
1928.245  However, the proposal included significant changes to both the 
ownership test and the formula for computing the tax.  
The ownership test continued to focus on concentration of ownership. 
However, the subcommittee’s proposal required a higher concentration of 
ownership—five or fewer individuals owning over fifty percent, 
compared to ten or fewer individuals owning over eighty percent. 
Furthermore, under the earlier proposal, concentration of ownership could 
be measured in terms of either voting power or rights to dividends. By 
 
 239. GREEN, supra note 200, at 140.   
 240. See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 63, at 347. The Roosevelt Administration did not take the 
lead in drafting the tax legislation during that legislative session. JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 98 (1985).  
 241. H.R. RES. 183, 73d Cong. (1933).   
 242. SUBCOMM. OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 73d CONG., 2d SESS., PREVENTION OF TAX 
AVOIDANCE: PRELIMINARY REPORT RELATIVE TO METHODS OF PREVENTING THE AVOIDANCE AND 
EVASION OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS TOGETHER WITH SUGGESTIONS FOR THE SIMPLIFICATION 
AND IMPROVEMENT THEREOF 6 (Comm. Print 1933) (hereinafter PREVENTION OF TAX AVOIDANCE).  
 243. Id.  It was one of many practices uncovered by an investigation conducted by the Senate 
Banking Committee. 78 CONG. REC. 2662 (1934) (statement of Rep. Samuel B. Hill).  
 244. Revenue Revision, 1934, Hearings Before the Comm. On Ways and Means, 73d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 55 [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Jere Cooper describing the collective thinking of the 
subcommittee).   
 245. Both proposals counted the following items as passive income:  rents, royalties, interest, 
dividends, annuities and gains from the sale of securities.  
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contrast, the 1934 proposal applied solely to voting stock, further limiting 
the number of cases falling within the scope of the new tax. Both changes 
made the provision more targeted.  
One modification to the ownership test occurred when it was debated 
on the floor of the House.  The House rejected the idea of using only 
voting stock to measure concentration of ownership, replacing it with the 
rule that considered all shares of stock—both voting and nonvoting.  The 
change was adopted without objection. Indeed, the House of 
Representatives entertained very little debate on any aspect of the entire 
income tax bill, for two reasons. First, the members simply deferred to the 
work of the subcommittee because the subject matter was so technical.246  
Second, debate on the bill was limited to 16 hours with amendments being 
restricted to those offered by the committee,247 which made it virtually 
futile to question any aspect of the proposal.248 Still, it is noteworthy that 
the specific formula for measuring concentration of ownership was not 
contested or questioned at later points in the legislative process either. 
The noncontroversial nature of the ownership test could reflect the fact 
that the subcommittee invested a good deal of time crafting it, resulting 
in a formula that produced a broad-based legislative consensus.249 
The formula for computing the resulting tax was substantially revised 
between the 1928 proposal and the 1934 proposal. In both years, the tax 
was imposed on the portion of a firm’s undistributed earnings that 
exceeded an exempt amount of its net income for the year. However, the 
exempt portion was substantially reduced from thirty percent to ten 
percent. The subcommittee believed that the vast majority of the firms 
singled out by the proposal were formed for the sole purpose to avoid the 
imposition of the surtax,250 which increased the willingness of the 
subcommittee to minimize the amount of earnings that a firm should be 
permitted to retain.  
Although relatively modest in scope, the personal holding company 
rules are a milestone in the way the government taxed business profits.  
Lawmakers were always concerned that using legal formalities as the sole 
basis for distinguishing firms would produce inequities.  They relied on 
the accumulated earnings penalty tax to address those inequities on a case-
by-case basis before they could identify an objective and systematic way 
 
 246. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 63, at 356.  
 247. Id.  
 248. The bill passed by an overwhelming majority: 390 to 7. 78 CONG. REC. 3005 (1934).  
 249. During an exchange with Roswell Magill of the Treasury Department, Subcommittee member 
Jere Cooper said that the subcommittee “worked some time to get [the] definition.  Hearings, supra note 
244, at 55. The definition consists of both the gross income test and the concentration of ownership test.  
Because the gross income test is identical to the one incorporated into the 1928 proposal, the statement 
implies that the deliberations were focused on the ownership test.   
 250. PREVENTION OF TAX AVOIDANCE, supra note 242, at 7.  
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to do so.  The personal holding company ownership test accomplishes that 
task by asking whether the firm’s concentration of ownership exceeds the 
“5 or fewer” threshold.251  The test reflects the fundamental reality that 
the interests of the firm and those of its owners overlap whenever 
ownership of the firm is sufficiently concentrated.  Isolating firms whose 
interests aligned with those of its owners is imperative when the payment 
of a dividend partly determines the total tax on corporate profits.  It is 
only when those interests overlap that the corporation would be inclined 
to consider the impact of the shareholder tax when deciding whether to 
pay a dividend.  Otherwise, the shareholder tax would be largely 
irrelevant to the firm.   
In future years, both the concentration of ownership principle and the 
specific threshold articulated in the personal holding company rules 
would be adapted and extended to other situations. One particularly 
meaningful fortification was included in the Revenue Act of 1936.252  
That legislation did not disturb the core “5 or fewer” requirement,253 but 
it did incorporate a new provision describing how stock owned by certain 
entities would be treated as owned by their owners.254  This rule 
supplemented an existing rule that required certain groups of related 
persons to count as one individual for purposes of the test.255 An even 
more elaborate set of attribution rules appeared in the Revenue Act of 
1937.256 Together, these changes helped ensure that taxpayers could not 
divide their shareholdings among related persons to avoid satisfying the 
ownership test.  
V. THE EVOLUTION OF THE TAX ON CORPORATE PROFITS 
While Congress experimented with ways to address the use of 
corporations to avoid tax, the disparities in the taxation of business profits 
grew more pronounced over time, underscoring the need for an effective 
way to distinguish the cases where the corporate tax rules would apply 
from those where they would not.   
Congress initially devised two separate ways for taxing business profits 
in 1913 because changes in the distribution practices of firms made it 
difficult for the existing uniform rules to function without producing 
 
 251. The 5 or fewer formulation brought the American approach very close to the one adopted by 
the British in 1922.  In its own version of personal holding company anti-tax avoidance legislation, a firm 
was subject to the law if 5 or fewer persons possessed over 50 percent of the firm’s voting power or shares.  
Finance Act of 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5 c. 19, § 21(6) (12 & 13 Geo.) ch. 17 (U.K.). 
 252. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, 49 Stat. 1648.  
 253. See id. § 351(b)(1)(B), 49 Stat. at 1732.   
 254. Id. § 351(b)(1)(C), 49 Stat. at 1732.  
 255. Id. § 351(b)(1)(D), 49 Stat. at 1732.  
 256. Id. § 354(a) (added by Revenue Act of 1937, ch. 815, § 1, 50 Stat. 813, 815-816). 
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distortions.  When it was routine for firms to distribute all their earnings, 
the tax system produced no meaningful inequities for taxpayers who were 
required to pay tax on their shares of a firm’s profits.  However, such a 
rule produces distortions and inequities once firms start to retain 
substantial portions of their annual earnings.  Lawmakers faced that 
dilemma in 1913, leading them to adopt a set of rules that allowed 
undistributed corporate earnings to be partially taxed while all other 
business profits remained fully taxed.   
The difference in the applicable rates was not very large during the first 
few years.  Therefore, the distortions and disparities were not significant 
enough to merit much attention.  However, that changed when the country 
entered World War I, leading Congress to experiment with ways to reduce 
the inequities.  The Revenue Act of 1917 included surtax rates up to 50 
percent, at a time when corporations appeared to be retaining roughly half 
their annual earnings.257  Leaving such a substantial sum exempt from the 
surtax would simply deny the treasury too much revenue.  To address this, 
Congress considered a number of options, including a fifteen percent tax 
on all undistributed profits.258  Ultimately, Congress chose to simply raise 
the corporate tax rate 2 percentage points above the normal individual 
rate, effectively making the corporate tax less of a substitute for the 
normal tax on the shareholders and more a freestanding tax on the firm.259   
The debate on the taxation of corporate retained earnings continued to 
simmer in the 1920s, but Congress did not make any changes until the 
early 1930s when the country was preoccupied with identifying a cause 
for the Great Depression.260  The unreasonable accumulation of corporate 
profits was a prime suspect because the practice was believed to upset the 
balance between consumption and production, resulting in the 
misallocation of economic resources.261  So, to fill a budget gap, President 
Roosevelt proposed a tax on undistributed corporate profits, viewing it as 
a way to discourage corporations from hoarding earnings.262  Despite 
opposition from corporate management, Congress passed the measure, 
while also keeping the existing corporate tax and eliminating the rule that 
made corporate dividends exempt to shareholders.263  The undistributed 
profits tax was substantial, ranging from seven percent to twenty-seven 
percent.264  Meanwhile, the corporate tax ranged from eight percent to 
 
 257. Steven A. Bank, The Dividend Divide in Anglo-American Corporate Taxation, 30 J. CORP. L. 
1, 18-19 (2004). 
 258. Id. at 19-20. 
 259. Id. at 20-22. 
 260. Bank, supra note 36, at 494-506. 
 261. Bank, supra note 257, at 22-23. 
 262. Id. at 24. 
 263. Id. at 25-28. 
 264. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 14(b), 49 Stat. 1648, 1656. 
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fifteen percent.265  The combination of measures helped transform 
corporations into separate taxpaying entities, not merely agents for 
collecting a tax imposed on the shareholders.   
By 1938, corporate managers successfully lobbied to eliminate the 
undistributed profits in exchange for an increase in the corporate tax rate 
to 19 percent.266  The change removed the disincentive to retain earnings, 
while leaving dividends to be taxed at both the firm level and the 
shareholder level. For corporate managers, the double taxation of 
corporate dividends was not an ideal outcome, but it was preferable to a 
tax on undistributed earnings because such a tax would have interfered 
with their discretion over the firm’s retained earnings.267 
This system of double taxing corporate dividends remains the most 
distinctive feature of the American system for taxing corporate profits 
today.  Among other things, it undeniably treats the firm as a separate and 
distinct entity, making it more important to restrict that approach to cases 
where there is a meaningful basis for treating the firm and its owners as 
separate and distinct taxpaying units. 
VI. VARIATIONS OF THE CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP PRINCIPLE 
ENACTED INTO LAW 
Over the years various iterations of the ownership test embedded in the 
personal holding company rules have been incorporated into several other 
anti-tax avoidance provisions.  Each of them suspends the application of 
the conventional rules for taxing corporate profits and effectively apply a 
variation of the rules that would apply to partnerships and other 
unincorporated business entities.  At the very least, the pattern suggests 
that Congress is satisfied that the concentration of ownership principle is 
an effective and meaningful way to distinguish corporations that behave 
as extension of their owners from those that do not. 
A. Foreign Personal Holding Companies 
In principle, the personal holding company rules and the accumulated 
earnings penalty tax should apply regardless if a corporation is domestic 
or foreign.  However, foreign corporations present a special problem 
because they are beyond the taxing jurisdiction of the U.S., making it 
impossible to enforce any anti-abuse rule that requires such a corporation 
to pay tax.  Thus, absent a special rule, a taxpayer could simply transfer 
certain income producing assets to a foreign corporation to skirt their 
 
 265. Id. § 13(b), 49 Stat. at 1655. 
 266. Bank, supra note 257, at 29.; Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 13(c), 52 Stat. 447, 455. 
 267. Bank, supra note 257, at 29-30. 
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obligation to pay tax on their worldwide income.268  This made it 
necessary for Congress to adopt a different approach.   
 The answer came in the form of the foreign personal holding company 
rules. The rules, passed by Congress in 1937, required any U.S. 
shareholder of a foreign personal holding to pay tax on his share of the 
corporation’s undistributed earnings as a constructive dividend.269  In 
order to determine whether a firm qualified as a foreign personal holding 
company, the statute applied a gross income test and an ownership test.270  
The latter test was borrowed from the personal holding company rules but 
adapted for foreign corporations. Specifically, the statute asks whether the 
five or fewer individuals are either U.S. citizens or residents.271  These 
entities were believed to serve the same purpose as their domestic 
counterparts.  In the words of Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, 
“[o]ne characteristic runs through all [the efforts to avoid tax].  It is the 
creation of a multiple personality in the taxpayer.”272  Quite simply, 
individuals were masquerading as corporations to avoid their full tax 
obligations. 
Although the personal holding company rules provided an antecedent 
for the ownership test, the idea of taxing the owners on their share of the 
firm’s profits was one Congress had deliberately abandoned in 1921 out 
of fear that it might be unconstitutional.273  No doubt, the absence of an 
alternative for collecting the tax compelled Congress to resurrect that 
approach in the context of foreign personal holding companies.  However, 
Congress also noted that Canada had already taken a similar approach for 
addressing foreign personal holding companies.274  Whatever the reason, 
because the statute requires the firm’s owners have to pay tax on their 
share of the firm’s earnings, the firm’s status as an extension of its owners 
becomes more explicit.   
The foreign personal holding company rules were repealed in 2004, 
once Congress concluded that they served no purpose in light of the rules 
addressing controlled foreign corporations and passive foreign 
investment companies, adopted in 1962 and 1986, respectively.275   
 
 268. This technique would insulate foreign source income from U.S. tax.  The U.S. source earnings 
would be subject to tax under   §§ 881 and 882 (2019). 
 269. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690 § 331 et seq. (added by Revenue Act of 1937, ch. 815 § 201, 50 
Stat. 813, 818).  
 270. Id. § 331, 50 Stat. at 818.  
 271. Id. § 331(a)(2), 50 Stat. at 818.  
 272. Tax Evasion and Avoidance: Hearings Before the J. Comm. on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, 
75th Cong. 11 (1937) (statement of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury).  
 273. Supra, note 179 and accompanying text. 
 274. Tax Evasion and Avoidance, Report of the J. Comm. On Tax Evasion and Avoidance of the 
Cong. Of the U.S., 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1937). 
 275. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-357, § 413, 118 Stat. 1418, 1506-1510.  
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B. Controlled Foreign Corporations  
Although effective in other regards, the foreign personal holding 
company rules did not reach situations involving a foreign corporation 
that was a wholly owned subsidiary of a widely held U.S. corporation.  
Thus, if a publicly traded company formed a subsidiary in a low tax 
foreign jurisdiction, none of the earnings derived by that subsidiary would 
be subject to U.S. tax. This result directly violates the general U.S. policy 
to require U.S. taxpayers to pay tax on their worldwide incomes.  To 
address this gap in the law, Congress enacted subpart F of the Internal 
Revenue Code.276   
The rules in subpart F generally require certain U.S. shareholders in 
certain foreign corporations to pay tax on their share of a portion of the 
foreign corporation’s earnings.  Only corporations that qualify as 
controlled foreign corporations (“CFCs”) fall within the scope of the rule.  
When a corporation so qualifies, a portion of its undistributed earnings 
will be taxed directly to the U.S. owners who own at least 10 percent of 
the firm’s voting power or value.277  Only if such 10 percent owners 
collectively own over 50 percent of the vote or value of the foreign 
corporation will the firm qualify as a CFC.278  In short, a foreign 
corporation will not be a CFC if its five largest shareholders each own 
exactly ten percent of its shares, because those shareholders will own 
exactly fifty percent of the firm’s value.  However, if just one of those 
shareholders owns over ten percent of the shares, that group of 
shareholders will collectively own over fifty percent of the firm’s value, 
causing the firm to qualify as a CFC.  In essence, these rules are another 
iteration of the “five-or-fewer” formulation that appears in the personal 
holding company ownership test.   
In fact, when the subpart F provisions were first proposed, one early 
idea was to apply the foreign personal holding company tax to certain 
foreign base companies where five or fewer corporations held more than 
fifty percent of the stock.279  That would have effectively made each of 
the foreign corporation’s shareholders liable for tax on their entire share 
 
 276. The government was well aware of the gap for years.  It deliberately did not address it, viewing 
the tax benefit as a way of promoting American investment and private enterprise in “free world” 
countries, which served America’s economic and geo-political interests.  Government policy did not shift 
until concerns about the balance of payments gained greater prominence. Vasujith Ram, Contextualizing 
the History of Subpart F, 161 TAX NOTES 315 (Oct. 15, 2018). 
 277. I.R.C. § 951(a)(1)(A) (2019). 
 278. I.R.C. § 957(a) (2019). 
 279. See Revenue Act of 1962: Hearings on H.R. 10650 Before the S. Comm. On Finance, 87th 
Cong., 2d Sess. at 3458 (1962) [hereinafter 1962 Hearings] (statement submitted by N.R. Danielian of 
the International Economic Policy Association).  See also id. at 3785 (New York State Bar Association 
Report on Foreign Income Provisions of Revenue Bill of 1962, H.R. 10650) and id. at 3932 (statement 
submitted by Thomas G. Corcoran). 
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of the company’s undistributed profits.  However, the Ways and Means 
Committee ultimately reported a bill that only required a firm’s ten 
percent shareholders to pay tax on a certain portion of the firm’s earnings.  
That effectively gives the firm a split personality.280  A portion of its 
earnings is taxed under the conventional rules that apply to incorporated 
firms, while the remainder is subject to tax under rules that resembled the 
ones that apply to partnerships.  However, the resemblance to partnership 
taxation is imperfect.  Among other things, the partners in a partnership 
report both their share of the firm’s income and its losses.281  Under the 
rules of subpart F, the ten percent shareholders cannot report their share 
of the firm’s losses.282   
When subpart F was originally proposed, some questioned the merits 
of its particular approach for reaching the undistributed earnings of a 
foreign corporation.  Some expressed concerns that U.S. investors would 
not be in a position to know whether they invested in a controlled foreign 
corporation because their level of ownership would not give them access 
to the records they would need to make that determination.283  Others 
questioned whether the 10 percent threshold wrongly assumed that the 
investor could exercise the kind of power to control the declaration of 
dividends and other matters pertinent to the legislation.284   
Despite these concerns, subpart F was enacted into law.  Although its 
basic structure has remained unchanged over the years, certain rules have 
 
 280. H. REP. NO. 87-1447, at 461 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 405.  See also S. REP. NO. 87-
1881, at 785 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 707. 
 281. See I.R.C. § 702(a) (2019). 
 282. This was one of the criticisms voiced about the proposal.  1962 Hearings, supra note 279, at 
3735 (New York State Bar Association Report on Foreign Income Provisions of Revenue Bill of 1962, 
H.R. 10650).   
 283. Id. at 3784-85.  
 284. Id. at 3455 (statement submitted by statement submitted by N.R. Danielian of the International 
Economic Policy Association).  Another witness put it this way:   
The result under the proposed new legislation is that the tax penalties upon the 10-percent 
stockholder have become far more severe and his capacity to protect himself from these penalties 
by complying with the law has been reduced—to the point that he will often and increasingly be 
powerless to avert them and his only practical remedy will be to dispose of his holdings.   
The stockholder of a ‘foreign personal holding company’ can always declare dividends to obtain 
the necessary funds to pay any tax.  By definition, a foreign personal holding company is over 50 
percent owned by five or fewer U.S. citizens or residents each of whom, irrespective of his 
percentage of ownership, is under the same compulsion to find the money to pay his tax-through 
and who collectively, being over 50 percent, have the necessary control to force the declaration of 
the required dividends.  
Under H. R.  10650, a U.S. person holding 10 percent or more, but less than effective control, in 
a foreign corporation is in a very different position.  Personally, he has a strong motive either to 
avert tax-through . . . However, his company will often be controlled by fellow stockholders who 
have no such motive, and frequently have opposing ones. 
 
Id. at 3930-31 (statement submitted by Thomas G.  Corcoran).  See also id. at 3047 (Statement of Adrian 
A. Kragen).  
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evolved in ways worth mentioning.  Under the original statute, all shares 
of stock were counted to determine whether a shareholder possessed the 
ten percent minimum, while only voting stock was counted to determine 
whether the ten percent shareholders collectively owned enough stock to 
make the corporation a CFC.285  In 1986, Congress decided that a foreign 
corporation would be a CFC if the firm’s 10 percent owners (by value) 
collectively owned over 50 percent of the firm’s vote or value.286  By 
2017, a shareholder would qualify as a 10 percent owner based on the 
either vote or value.287   
The 2017 Tax Act also added new rules that effectively cause a CFC’s 
10 percent shareholders to include in their income a larger portion of the 
CFC’s undistributed earnings.288  This change seems to reaffirm a 
Congressional policy to suspend the ordinary rules for taxing corporate 
profits when the firm’s ownership is sufficiently concentrated, justifying 
the practice of taxing the owners on their share of the firm’s undistributed 
earnings. 
C. Common Controlled Corporations  
In 1950, Congress introduced a surtax exemption on the first $25,000 
of a corporation’s taxable income.289  In response, taxpayers began to 
fragment their businesses into several corporations in order to claim 
multiple exemptions.  
There were several attempts to combat the abuse. First, Congress relied 
on the Treasury Department to use special powers granted to it to address 
the use of multiple corporations to avoid tax.290  Congress took a different 
approach in 1962, imposing a 6 percent penalty on affiliated groups that 
operated through multiple corporations.291  The statute targeted three 
different types of corporate structures.  One type was the brother-sister 
controlled group, which was defined as two or more corporations each of 
whose stock was owned eighty percent or more (by vote or value) by one 
individual, estate, or trust.292  In 1969, Congress redefined a brother-sister 
 
 285. H. Rep. No. 88-2508, at 1168 (1962) (Conf. Rep.). 
 286. I.R.C. § 957 (2019). 
 287. I.R.C. § 958(b) (2019) (as amended by Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 
14213, 131 Stat. 2054, 2217). 
 288. I.R.C. § 951A (2019). 
 289. See Tax Reform Act of 1969: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Finance on H.R. 13270, 91st 
Cong. 1164 et seq. (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Hearings] (statement of James W. Riddell). 
 290. S. REP. NO. 82-781 at 68-69 (1951). Those powers are described in Code sections 269 and 482, 
former sections 45 and 129.  I.R.C. §§ 269 and 482 (2019) (formerly at I.R.C. §§ 45 and 129). 
 291. H. REP. NO. 88-749, at 118 (1964).  
 292. The second was the parent-subsidiary controlled group, which consisted of one or more chains 
of corporations connected with a common parent corporation through 80 percent or more stock ownership, 
determined by vote or value. The third was a combined group consisting of three or more corporations, 
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controlled group to consist of two or more corporations which are owned 
80 percent or more (by vote or value) by five or fewer persons.293  By 
2004, Congress reduced the 80 percent threshold to 50 percent, bringing 
the definition more closely in line with the approach found in the 
ownership test for the personal holding company rules.294  The change 
was made to eliminate the possibility that taxpayers could obtain the 
benefit of the graduated rates through the use of multiple corporations that 
are effectively commonly controlled even though the 80 percent test was 
not satisfied.295  Under the current rules, a brother-sister controlled group 
exists when 5 or fewer individuals, estates or trusts own over 50 percent 
of the vote or value of the corporations.296  
Now that all corporate income is taxed at a flat rate of twenty-one 
percent, there may no longer be a need for the rules.  However, when the 
need did exist, Congress not only relied on the concentration of ownership 
principle to address it, but did so by using a test inspired by the ownership 
test in the personal holding company rules.  In doing so, Congress yet 
again signaled that such an ownership structure merits treating the firm as 
a mere extension of its owners, not as a separate entity that is distinct from 
its owners.297  
D. The Passive Activity Rules 
The passive activity rules explicitly borrow the personal holding 
company ownership test to define the class of taxpayers subject to its anti-
tax avoidance provisions. The passive activity rules are designed to 
prevent individuals from inappropriately benefitting from the tax savings 
generated through tax shelters, a term that describes investments in which 
a significant portion of the taxpayer’s return is derived from tax savings, 
not real economic earnings.298  The tax savings could take the form of 
deductions that could offset income from another source.  The savings 
 
each of which is a member of a parent-subsidiary group or a brother-sister group, and one of which is a 
common parent corporation.  
 293. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 401, 83 Stat. 487, 602.  In addition, each 
member of the ownership group had to individually own more than 50% of each corporation being tested.   
 294. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 900(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1650. 
 295. S. Rep. No. 108-192, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003); Conf. Rep. No. 108-755, 108th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (2004).  
 296. I.R.C. § 1563(a)(1), (f)(5) (2019). Nonvoting nonparticipating preferred stock does not count 
as stock for purposes of the test.  I.R.C. § 1563(c) (2019).  
 297. The Kennedy Administration may have been a step ahead of Congress.  In 1963, it proposed 
defining a brother-sister group to exist where five or fewer individuals or corporations owned at least 80 
percent of each corporation.  Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1964 before the Committee on Ways and 
Means, Feb. 6, 1963 (testimony of Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon).  
 298. Joint Committee on Taxation, Tax Reform Proposals:  Tax Shelters and Minimum Tax (JCS-
39-85), Aug. 7, 1985, at 2.  
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could also take the form of tax credits that could offset the tax an 
individual would otherwise have to pay.   
Congress believed that tax shelters eroded the perceived and real 
fairness of the tax system. One legislative response, enacted in 1986, was 
a set of rules that imposed limits on a taxpayer’s ability to claim loss 
deductions and tax credits from passive activities.299  The rules apply 
specifically to individuals, estates, and trusts and generally deny a 
taxpayer the ability to utilize passive activity losses to offset income from 
non-passive activities. 300  Thus, the rules directly address the tax shelters 
whose primary appeal were tax losses that individuals could use to offset 
income from other sources.  
The rules also apply to a targeted group of corporations so that 
individuals cannot use such entities to hide their personal investments in 
tax shelters.  Thus, a firm could be subject to the passive activity rules if 
it constitutes a closely held corporation,301 a term that refers to any 
corporation that meets the stock ownership test described in the personal 
holding company rules.302 A closely held corporation cannot utilize 
passive losses to offset portfolio income, such as interest and dividends.  
Rather, it can only use such losses to offset active business income.303 As 
incorporated into the passive activity rules, the personal holding company 
ownership test serves the same purpose that it was intended to perform in 
the 1934 act: to distinguish corporations that are the alter egos of their 
owners from those that are separate and independent from them in a 
meaningful way.  
E. Limitation on Benefits under the Model U.S. Tax Treaty 
When the U.S. negotiates a bilateral tax treaty (or proposes changes to 
an existing one), it begins with a template known as the U.S. Model Tax 
Treaty.304 The current version of that document contains a lengthy 
provision designed to ensure that the benefits of the treaty are only 
enjoyed by persons who are citizens or residents of the two treaty 
signatory countries.305  The provision functions as an anti-abuse rule that 
seeks to identify cases where someone who would ordinarily qualify as a 
 
 299. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 501(a).  
 300. I.R.C. § 469(a).   
 301. I.R.C. § 469(a)(2)(B).   
 302. The statutes specifically cover any corporation that qualifies as a closely held corporation. 
I.R.C. § 469(a)(2)(B). Such a corporation is any corporation that satisfies the personal holding company 
ownership test. I.R.C. §§ 469(j)(1); 465(a)(1)(B).   
 303. I.R.C. § 469(e)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.469-1T(g)(4)(i).  
 304. CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON, ET AL., TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS: 
MATERIALS, TEXT AND PROBLEMS ¶ 1245 (4th ed. 2011). 
 305. 2016 U.S. Model Tax Treaty, art. 22. 
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citizen or resident of either treaty partner will not count as one. The rules 
address both individuals and business entities. One of the rules that 
applies to business entities contains clear echoes of the ownership test 
from the personal holding company rules. Under the rule, if the taxpayer 
is a corporation other than a publicly traded corporation, there are two 
rules under which a corporation could remain eligible for treaty benefits. 
The first rule applies to any privately held company. The second is 
directed at subsidiaries of publicly traded companies. The latter rule 
applies an ownership test that is satisfied if at least 50 percent of a 
corporation’s voting power and value is owned directly or indirectly by 
five or fewer publicly traded companies.306  Thus, the test focuses on 
concentration of ownership by publicly traded companies. 
To understand these rules, it is helpful to know the context in which 
the provisions were drafted and the purposes that treaties serve. For many 
years, U.S. tax policy was oriented toward achieving nondiscriminatory 
tax treatment of U.S. and foreign based multinational corporations 
abroad. Accordingly, there were very few provisions of U.S. domestic law 
that provided tax relief to foreign persons.307  However, in the 1960s, the 
country’s position began to change because it became more important to 
attract foreign capital to finance domestic investment.308  That led 
Congress to enact the Foreign Investors Tax Act, which exempted 
foreigners from tax on portfolio gains.309   
However, once the U.S. became one of the world’s largest debtor 
nations with a huge trade deficit and large inflows of capital, Congress 
became more concerned with limiting the revenue loss that occurred when 
foreigners either (1) took advantage of rules granting tax relief, or (2) 
exploited the benefits available under the network of tax treaties.310  The 
limitation on benefits rules takes on that job in part by classifying 
corporations that are extensions of their owners from those that are 
separate and distinct from their owners.  Moreover, a variation of the five 
or fewer formulation appears yet again to function as the measuring rod.  
The only difference is that it would be good for the firm to be viewed as 
an extension of the owner because that would allow the taxpayer to enjoy 
the benefits available under the treaty.  In the anti-abuse rules discussed 
 
 306. 2016 U.S. Model Tax Treaty, art. 22(2)(d)(i).  
 307. Simone M. Haug, The United States Policy of Stringent Anti-Treaty Shopping Provisions:  A 
Comparative Analysis, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 191, 238 (1996) (citing Robert A. Ragland, U.S. 
INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY FOR A GLOBAL ECONOMY E-2 (1991)).  
 308. Id. Tax policy was also reoriented to attract foreign capital. This was accomplished by adopting 
rules that produce uniform treatment of domestic and foreign operations of U.S. persons, a policy referred 
to as capital export neutrality. This is partly reflected by the adoption of the controlled foreign corporation 
provisions in 1962.  
 309. Foreign Investors Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1539 (1966).  
 310. Haug, supra note 307, at 239 (citing Peter R. Merill & Robert J. Patrick, U.S. International 
Tax Policy for a Global Economy, TAX NOTES INT’L, Jan. 20, 1992, at 137).  
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above, the taxpayer would not be entitled to tax savings when the firm 
satisfied the concentration of ownership test. 
F. S Corporations 
The anti-tax avoidance rules discussed above address situations where 
a corporation can be used to conceal the identity of a taxpayer who may 
try take advantage of certain tax benefits that might not otherwise be 
available. However, Congress has not always been uniformly focused on 
preserving the integrity of the two-track system for taxing business 
profits. Perhaps the most prominent instance occurred in the 1950s, when 
Congress deliberately offered taxpayers the option to elect the method for 
taxing the profits of a business without regard to the firm’s state law 
business form.  
Under one entity classification election adopted in 1954 referred to as 
subchapter R, sole proprietorships and partnerships could elect to be taxed 
as if they were corporations.311  Under another provision adopted in 1958, 
corporations could elect to be treated as if they were partnerships.312  
Subchapter R was repealed in 1957,313 while the election for corporations 
remains in existence today and can be found in subchapter S of the 
Internal Revenue Code.314  That election has always been restricted to 
certain eligible corporations. One eligibility requirement is that the firm’s 
shareholders not exceed a certain number. Initially, the limit was ten; 
today the limit is 100.315  The rules of subchapter S will only apply if the 
shareholders unanimously consent.316 When the subchapter S rules apply, 
the profits of the corporation are essentially taxed as if they were derived 
by a partnership. Thus, the firm itself pays no tax on its earnings; instead, 
the owners pay tax on their share of the earnings each year, regardless of 
whether they actually received a distribution from the firm.317 Conversely, 
 
 311. I.R.C. § 1361 (1954).   
 312. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 64, 72 Stat. 1606, 1650.  
 313. The Treasury Department was expected to issue regulations addressing the details of the new 
election.  However, after four years, no regulations had been issued.  In the interim, taxpayers were 
reluctant to take advantage of the option in the absence of clarifying guidance from the government.  
Congress repealed the provision because it had not been effectively used. Mirit Eyal-Cohen, When 
American Small Business Hit the Jackpot:  Taxes, Politics and the History of Organizational Choice in 
the 1950’s, 6 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 36-37 (2008).  
 314. I.R.C. § 1361-1378.  
 315. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 64, 72 Stat. 1606, 1650 
(establishing the ten shareholder limit); American Jobs Creation Act of 1004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 
232(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1434 (raising the limit to 100).  See also I.R.C § 1361(b) for the entire list of 
conditions that must be met to qualify for the election.   
 316. I.R.C. § 1362(a)(2). 
 317. I.R.C. § 1366(a). 
51
Winchester: A Tax Theory of the Firm
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019
52 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88 
the owners enjoy tax savings in any year the firm generates a loss.318 
Congress enacted subchapters R and S during a time when it began to 
use the tax system as a tool to achieve certain social and economic 
goals.319  In this instance, there was substantial evidence that the existing 
tax rules were promoting oligopolies and monopolies at the expense of 
small businesses.320  Congress adopted subchapter R to eliminate this 
discriminatory effect of the federal tax law.321  Similarly, subchapter S 
was intended to provide tax relief to small businesses so they could more 
effectively compete in the economy.322   
Thus, the elections that Congress made available to taxpayers in 
subchapters R and S are distinct measures designed to achieve specific 
non-tax policies. They do not represent part of a congressional effort to 
rationalize the taxation of business profits or to preserve the integrity of 
the corporate tax.323  It is significant that the election is just that—an 
option—for the firm to be treated in one way or another.  It is also 
revealing that even after the elections were incorporated into the Internal 
Revenue Code, Congress adopted additional anti-abuse rules that 
employed the concentration of ownership principle. That would include 
all the rules discussed above starting with the rules for controlled foreign 
corporations. 
VII. THEORIES OF FIRM BEHAVIOR 
The noncontroversial and durable quality of the personal holding 
company ownership test and its variations may reflect a longstanding 
consensus about the distinct dynamics of the modern commercial 
enterprise. Those dynamics were thoroughly explored in academic 
writings published both before and after passage of the personal holding 
company rules. This section summarizes that body of scholarly literature. 
A. Berle and Means 
Perhaps the most thorough and influential study of corporations was 
published in 1932, just two years before Congress passed the personal 
holding company rules. Entitled THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY, this study was the product of two Ivy League 
 
 318. Id. 
 319. Eyal-Cohen, supra note 313, at 20.  
 320. Id. at 15.  
 321. S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 118 (1954).  
 322. S. REP. NO. 85-1237, at 3 (1958).   
 323. That statement applies with particular force to the rules under subchapter S.  See, Roberta 
Mann, Subchapter S: Vive Le Difference!, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 65 (2014).  
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professors: Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardner C. Means.324  Time magazine 
described the book as “the economic Bible of the Roosevelt 
Administration.”325  It would also become the most quoted text in 
corporate governance studies.  Their study showed that the means of 
production in the U.S. economy was severely concentrated in the hands 
of the country’s 200 largest corporations.  It also described how the vast 
majority of stockholders had effectively lost control of their property, 
which had become subject to the sole control of professional managers 
whose interests could not be expected to overlap with those of the 
company’s investors.326  In short, ownership had become separated from 
control. The authors went so far as to conclude that the owners of 
corporate stock had become subservient to management.327   
Berle and Means were careful to note that their observations and 
conclusions did not apply to all corporations. Rather, they only applied to 
the firms they described as quasi-public corporations. The dynamics of 
such firms are materially different from the ones that characterize a 
closely held one.  In fact, the mere act of incorporating a closely held firm 
would not constitute a material change for all practical purposes, 
according to Berle and Means. In their words, “[i]t has long been possible 
for an individual to incorporate his business even though it still represents 
his own investment, his own activities, and his own business transactions; 
he has in fact merely created a legal alter ego by setting up a corporation 
as the nominal vehicle.”328  In that instance, ownership and control 
overlap.  
By contrast, the separation of ownership and control that distinguishes 
the quasi-public corporation produces a condition where “the interests of 
owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge, and where 
many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power 
disappear.”329  Thus, Berle and Means appreciated the fact that their 
observations about the special dynamics that operate in the modern 
industrial enterprise do not apply uniformly to all corporations.  Rather, 
it depends on the extent to which the parties who own the firm also control 
it. 
Berle and Means believed that corporations could be roughly classified 
along a continuum based on the degree and control exercised by their 
shareholders. They conceptualized control as existing in five different 
forms: 
 
 324. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 83.  
 325. Transportation: Credit Manager, TIME, Apr. 24, 1933, at 14.  
 326. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 83, at 6-7.  
 327. Id. at 277.  
 328. Id. at 4.  
 329. Id. at 6.  
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(1) Control through almost complete ownership, 
(2) Majority control, 
(3) Control through a legal device without majority ownership, 
(4) Minority control, 
(5) Management control.330 
The first form of control exists in what Berle and Means refer to as the 
private corporation, i.e. one that consists of a single individual or a small 
group of associates owning all or practically all of the outstanding stock 
of the firm.331  Majority control referred to cases where the ownership of 
a majority of the stock by a single individual or small group provided that 
group with virtually all the legal powers of control, particularly the power 
to select the company’s board of directors.332 Legal devices of control 
typically consolidate or concentrate voting power in a single individual or 
small group. That would be the case when a corporation issues nonvoting 
stock, effectively leaving all control in the hands of the investors who own 
the voting stock.333 Minority control generally exists when a small group 
holds a sufficient interest to be in a position to dominate a corporation 
through the voting power represented by their shares of stock.334 Finally, 
management control prevails when the stock is so widely held that no 
individual or small group even has a minority interest large enough to 
dominate.335   
It is noteworthy how closely the different categories of control 
envisioned by Berle and Means seem to be reflected in the personal 
holding company ownership test and its variations. At their core, those 
tests focus on concentration of ownership or control. Concentrated 
ownership is precisely the basis for the first two categories of control 
articulated by Berle and Means. Their formulations refer to the presence 
of a small group that owns a certain threshold of shares and the power 
associated with the block of shares. The personal holding company rules 
operate on the same premise and translate the idea into the five or fewer 
test.  Concentrated control is also a concept built into the ownership test 
contained in the foreign personal holding company rules and the 
controlled foreign corporation provisions  
The Berle and Means book may have been a widely read publication, 
 
 330. Id. at 70.  
 331. Id.; Id. at 93. For purposes of their analysis, Berle and Means classified a corporation as private 
if at least 80 percent of the stock was held by a compact group of individuals.  
 332. Id. at 71; Id. at 93. For purposes of their analysis, a firm was majority owned if the public 
owned less than 50 percent of the stock, but at least 20 percent. 
 333. Id. at 72-80.  A similar result would occur when shareholders transfer their shares to a voting 
trust, leaving the trustee the sole individual authorized to vote the shares.  Id.  
 334. Id. at 80 (Berle and Means considered this to be the case when the relevant group owns at least 
20 percent but less than 50 percent of the stock). 
 335. Id. at 84.  
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but it was not the first to offer some of the observations that it described. 
The separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation had 
been understood by scholars for years.336  It was even expressly 
acknowledged that management could not be relied on to pursue the 
interests of absentee owners.337  Indeed, the separation of ownership and 
control was essential to the very structure of the corporate form. That is 
what made it uniquely suited to accommodate large scale commercial 
enterprises, fueling the growth of industrial firms requiring enormous 
commitments of capital.338   
The earlier studies did not explicitly acknowledge how observations 
about the separation of ownership and control did not apply to closely 
held firms. Yet this distinction was implicit in those studies because they 
limited their examination to the large-scale industrial enterprise. Thus, 
Berle and Means were explicit about drawing a distinction that was 
widely understood to exist, including by the members of Congress 
responsible for drafting anti-tax avoidance legislation. At the very least, 
those tax law writers intuitively appreciated that closely held corporations 
behaved more like traditional partnerships and unlike the publicly traded 
firms that began to dominate the economic landscape. That became 
evident during the deliberations on various aspects of the bills under 
consideration during the formative years of the modern income tax. It is 
also evident from the content of some the laws enacted during the period.  
It may not be possible to directly connect the personal holding 
company ownership test to insights offered by Berle and Means or anyone 
else. Still, it seems more than coincidental that the ownership test tracks 
so closely some key concepts that had been developed by the 
contemporary scholars in the field.  At the very least, these insights might 
help explain why the ownership test proved to be so noncontroversial, 
durable, and effective.  
 
 336. E.g., ROBERT BROOKINGS, INDUSTRIAL OWNERSHIP: ITS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
SIGNIFICANCE 1-24 (1925) (describing the separation of ownership from management and illustrating how 
the large scale industrial firms that came to dominate the economy had owners who ceased to exercise 
their right to select the managers, allowing the managers to effectively select themselves); THORSTEIN 
VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN RECENT TIMES 82-100 (1923) (describing 
the separation of ownership and emphasizing how owners in the modern industrialized firm have been 
reduced to mere suppliers of capital whose principal concern is a return on their investment, while 
management furnishes specialized skills in the service of a complex commercial institution); THOMAS 
NIXON CARVER, THE PRESENT ECONOMIC REVOLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES 90-122 (1925) 
(describing how laborers were accounting for a growing share of industrial securities, helping to displace 
the dominant position of the rich and making the ownership of such firms more and more diffuse); I. 
MAURICE WORMSER, FRANKENSTEIN, INCORPORATED 87-160 (1931) (describing how managers of 
industrial firms frequently own no shares in the companies they manage, while the owners of its shares 
might not have any voting power).  
 337. BROOKINGS, supra, note 336, at 23.  
 338. Id.  
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B. Modern Economic Theories of the Firm 
Modern economic theories of the firm continue to recognize the 
fundamental insight that a firm’s concentration of ownership will 
determine the way it behaves.  Economic theories of the firm try to 
explain the boundaries of the firm. More specifically, they try to explain 
why some transactions occur within firms and others occur in the 
marketplace.  In 1937, Ronald Coase was the first to offer a theory.339  
Since then, economists have worked to refine his theories.340  The most 
recent strand of literature is called the property rights theory of the firm.341  
According to that theory, firms arise when parties are engaged in long 
term relationships and make relationship-specific investments.342  The 
terms of the relationship are generally spelled out in a contract. However, 
that document does not anticipate every possible issue that may arise over 
the course of the relationship. One mechanism for addressing an 
incomplete contract is for one party to simply acquire ownership of the 
other party. This way, the acquiring party can dictate a resolution of 
matters that the parties did not anticipate.   
The property rights theory posits that the owner of an asset (such as a 
firm) has the power to fill any gaps in an incomplete contract because 
ownership of the asset comes with residual rights of control over it. Thus, 
the owner can dictate all uses of an asset not specified in a contract. More 
importantly, ownership affects substantive economic outcomes because 
the owner of an asset is the party with the strongest incentives to invest in 
it. If ownership of the asset changes, the incentive shifts from one party 
to another.  
According to property rights theory, the economic boundaries of a firm 
will include all assets that are under common or unified control; 
formalistic or legalistic boundaries are irrelevant.  Thus, if one 
corporation is wholly owned by another, the property rights theory would 
not view the two legal entities as two separate economic entities.  Instead, 
the two would constitute one single firm.  Berle and Means would have 
 
 339. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) 
 340. E.g., Oliver E. Williamson, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST 
IMPLICATIONS (1975); Oliver E. Williamson, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985); 
Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and 
the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L.  AND ECON. 297 (1978);  
 341. This theory is developed and discussed in detail in Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver Hart, The 
Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 
(1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J.  POL.  ECON.  1119 
(1990); OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995); and Oliver Hart, An 
Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (1989).  
 342. The basic elements of the property rights theory of the firm were cogently synthesized by T. 
Christopher Borek, et al., Tax Shelters or Efficient Tax Planning? A Theory of the Firm Perspective on 
the Economic Substance Doctrine, 57 J. L. & ECON. 975, 978-981 (2014).  
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drawn the same conclusion.  In other words, ownership of a firm 
continues to play a central role in economic theories that explain the 
boundaries of the firm.  That crucial insight explains why the 
concentration of ownership principle offers a fundamentally sound basis 
for determining whether a firm should be treated by the tax system as an 
extension of its owners or as a freestanding taxpaying unit that is separate 
and distinct from them.     
C. Agency Theory  
The insights of agency theory may also help explain the durability and 
power of concentration of ownership as an organizing principle for 
distinguishing firms for tax purposes.343  An agency relationship arises 
whenever one or more parties (the principal(s)) engage another party (the 
agent) to perform on their behalf some service that requires the agent to 
exercise delegated decision-making authority.344  Agency theory is based 
on the fundamental observation that the agent will not always act in the 
best interests of the principal because the two parties may have divergent 
interests in certain situations.345  Within a corporation, the relationship 
between the shareholders and management is one example of an agency 
relationship, with the shareholders acting as the principal and 
management serving as their agents. As general agency theory makes 
clear, one should not expect the agent (management) to always act in ways 
that serve the best interests of the principals (shareholders), particularly 
when those interests conflict.   
Several scholars have already described how common issues arising in 
a corporation’s business affairs can reveal the conflicting interests of 
shareholders and managers.346  Generally, shareholders must monitor 
management to guard against decisions that will result in higher 
management compensation and prestige without a corresponding benefit 
to shareholders. This tension became apparent during the formative years 
of the income tax.  Management at publicly owned firms fought the 
adoption of a tax on undistributed corporate profits, viewing it as a threat 
to their unrestricted power to set dividend policy.347  In order to repel 
 
 343. For a general discussion of agency theory and the agency cost problem in the economics and 
finance literature, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Frank H. Easterbrook, Two 
Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 650 (1984); and Eugene Fama, Agency 
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J.  POL. ECON. 288 (1980).  
 344. Jensen & Meckling, supra, note 343, at 308.   
 345. Id.   
 346. See e.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 83.  
 347. Steven A. Bank, Corporate Managers, Agency Costs, and the Rise of Double Taxation, 44 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 167, 171 note 18 (2002) (citing Kevin J. Murphy, Corporate Performance and 
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Congressional efforts to impose such a tax, they aligned themselves with 
the forces fighting for a shareholder tax on dividends, even though that 
would burden the firm’s shareholders with a double tax on the dividends 
they received.348   
Agency theory also explains the various ways that firms responded 
when Congress cut the tax on corporate dividends in 2003.  Prior to the 
legislation, corporate dividends were taxed at the same rate as other types 
of income.  Afterwards, most dividends were taxed at a substantially 
lower rate, creating a potential incentive for corporations to distribute 
their earnings. Indeed, dividends rose sharply and quickly after the law 
took effect.  However, the response was more dramatic and pronounced 
in firms whose executives owned a larger fraction of outstanding shares 
and in firms with large shareholders who occupied seats on the board of 
directors.349  Ordinarily, managers would prefer to retain earnings to fund 
pet projects.  However, for managers who also owned large blocks of 
stock, a cut in the dividend tax changed the calculus.  For those managers, 
the tax cut suddenly made it more attractive for them to have a dividend 
in their pocket than to have the power to spend the firm’s earnings.350  
Along the same lines, the large shareholders who occupied board seats 
simply used their power and influence to pressure the board to declare 
dividends.351  If ownership was too dispersed to allow any individual 
shareholders to occupy a seat on the board, a cut in the dividend tax would 
not have affected the decision about whether it was in the company’s best 
interest to declare a dividend. 
Agency theory would seem to offer a similar explanation for the 
enduring power of the ownership test in the personal holding company 
rules.  The test only captures firms whose shares are owned in blocks large 
enough to represent an influential voice in the firm’s affairs, even if the 
holder does not actually sit on the board or occupy a position in 
management. In some cases, there may be one individual who owns a 
block large enough to dictate company policy. In others, there will be 
more than one person with such power. However, the number will be a 
finite one that is small enough for any problems normally associated with 
collective action to be minimized.352  Therefore, even when there is no 
 
Managerial Renumeration: An Empirical Analysis, 7 J. ACC. & ECON. 11, 11-12 (1985); James R. Repetti, 
The Misuse of Tax Incentives to Align Management-Shareholder Interests, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 697, 698-
699 (1997)).  
 348. Id. at 217-223.  
 349. Raz Chetty & Emmanuel Saez, An Agency Theory of Dividend Taxation, 1-2 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13538, 2007). 
 350. Id. at 3.  
 351. Id.  
 352. Those difficulties include rational apathy and the temptation of individual shareholders to take 
a free ride.  Robert Charles Clark, CORPORATE LAW 389-94 (Francis A. Allen et al. Eds., 1986).   
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single person who can dictate policy, management is unlikely to pursue 
its interests at the expense of the controlling group of shareholders.  
VIII. A PROPOSAL FOR CLASSIFYING FIRMS FOR TAX PURPOSES 
A. The Basic Elements  
This Article has argued that the tax system should use concentration of 
ownership as the basis for classifying business firms for all purposes. It 
has also suggested that the test for classifying business firms could be 
modeled after the personal holding company ownership test, a test that 
asks whether five or fewer individuals own over half the value of a 
corporation for the last six months of the year.353  If such a test were to be 
applied to classify firms for all income tax purposes, it would require that 
five or fewer taxpayers (individuals or firms classified as separate entities 
under test) own over half the value of any firm during some relevant 
window of time.354  Whenever the test is met, the firm would not 
constitute a taxable entity.  That would cause the profits of the firm to be 
taxed under the default rules that now apply to a partnership if there are 
multiple owners.  The firm would be entirely disregarded if there is only 
one owner, leaving the activities of the firm attributed to the owner as if 
it were a sole proprietorship.  In cases where the firm did not possess the 
necessary concentration of ownership, it would be treated as a corporation 
for tax purposes, causing the firm’s profits to be taxed at both the entity 
and shareholder levels.  
In order to function properly, the concentration of ownership test 
should be supplemented with attribution rules similar to the ones currently 
used within the personal holding company context.355  Those rules 
accomplish two things.  First, some of the rules cause individuals (and 
entities) to be treated as the constructive owners of stock that is actually 
owned by certain related persons.  So, for example, if two spouses each 
own stock in Company A, one spouse would be considered the 
 
 353. I.R.C. § 542(a)(2).  
 354. There is reason to believe that the five or fewer formulation fairly estimates the concentration 
necessary to cause a firm to behave like an extension of its owners.  A 2006 government analysis of S 
corporations examined the incidence of firms whose officers received no compensation for the services 
they performed, suggesting that the firm substituted dividends for such compensation.  Such a strategy 
gives the officers access to the firm’s earnings without triggering any employment tax liability.  The study 
found that of the firms engaging in this technique, 87 percent had no more than 2 shareholders and 93 
percent had no more than 3.  Firms with up to 10 shareholders accounted for 99 percent of the total cases.  
NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS – VOLUME 1, 314 (2008).  In a 
transaction involving two unrelated persons, the officer would have insisted on receiving compensation 
for the work, and the firm would have paid a market rate.  
 355. See I.R.C. § 318 (2005).  
59
Winchester: A Tax Theory of the Firm
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019
60 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88 
constructive owner of any stock actually owned by the other, and vice 
versa.356  This rule prevents an individual from bypassing the 
concentration of ownership test by transferring stock to a related person 
to disguise the true ownership. Second, the attribution rules can also treat 
stock owned by certain entities as being constructively owned by the 
entity’s owners. Under one such rule, any stock owned by a partnership 
is treated as proportionally owned by its partners.357  Thus, if a partnership 
owned 100 shares of stock in Company A, a partner who owned a 60 
percent interest in the partnership would constructively own 60 shares of 
Company A stock.  
A few hypotheticals will illustrate how this combination of rules would 
apply to determine the tax classification of business firms. Consider the 
case of a firm consisting of a group of ten investors. If each investor 
owned an equal share of the firm, each would own a ten percent interest 
in the firm. Under the five or fewer test, the firm would be classified as a 
corporation because five of the investors would not own over half the 
value of the firm—they would own exactly half. It is conceivable that one 
of the investors could transfer a fractional interest to another investor so 
that the firm could be classified as a partnership. This type of tax planning 
is theoretically possible. However, because control is the defining 
characteristic of ownership, there are very significant practical reasons 
why it would not occur.358 Parties will be extremely reluctant to shift 
ownership solely to achieve a particular tax outcome unless they are also 
willing to accept the change in power dynamics that comes with the new 
allocation of ownership interests.359   
In the hypothetical involving the ten investors, under an even allocation 
of ownership interests, it would take six investors working in concert to 
authorize any action by the firm. If ownership interests are not evenly 
allocated, it would take fewer investors to do so. The smaller the control 
group, the more likely the firm will be used to serve the interests of the 
individuals comprising that group. As the size of the control group grows, 
it becomes more difficult for the firm to be used to accomplish the 
interests of any particular investor or group of investors. Among other 
things, each additional member of the control group adds to the diversity 
of interests, making it difficult for them to use the firm to optimize the tax 
consequences for all of them.360 Thus, any adjustment in ownership will 
affect the allocation of control.  
One might imagine that tax planners would try to manipulate the 
 
 356. I.R.C. § 318(a)(1)(A)(i) (2005).  
 357. I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(A) (2005).  
 358. Borek, supra note 342, at 996.  
 359. Id. at 999.  
 360. Hamill, supra note 24, at 426 (1996).  
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classification of a firm by using a tiered ownership structure. Consider the 
case of an operating company with widely dispersed ownership, including 
some owners who are classified as corporations. The concentration of 
ownership test would treat the company as a corporation for tax purposes. 
A tiered ownership structure would not change that result. In a tiered 
structure, the operating company could be owned by five first-tier firms. 
Each first-tier firm would be owned by five second-tier firms. Each 
second-tier firm would be owned by five third-tier firms, and so on. The 
attribution rules would disregard the intermediate firms, causing the 
individuals and corporations owning interests in the top-tier firms to be 
treated as the owners of the operating company.361 In the final analysis, 
the company would be treated as having the same number of owners as it 
did without the intermediate tiers of firms. Thus, it would not be possible 
for a company with diluted ownership to successfully use a tiered 
structure to transform itself from a corporation to a nontaxable entity. 
One could also imagine that tax planners might consider ways to 
structure an investment so that the income of a U.S. corporation could be 
shifted to a low- or no-tax foreign jurisdiction.  However, existing 
international provisions of the Internal Revenue Code would seem to 
prevent such a strategy from achieving that objective.  Consider a U.S. 
corporation that is directly owned by members of the public.  Under 
current rules, the firm is a corporation because it is incorporated under 
state law.  For that reason, the firm is subject to U.S. tax on any income it 
derives, while its shareholders are subject to U.S. tax on amounts they 
receive from the firm as a dividend.  A tiered structure utilizing a foreign 
entity would produce the same result.  The basic strategy might be to 
interpose a foreign corporation in between the shareholders and the 
existing operating company, resulting in the U.S. operating company 
becoming the wholly owned subsidiary of a foreign company that is 
publicly traded.  Because it would have one owner, the operating 
company would be disregarded under the concentration of ownership 
principle, while that upper tier foreign company would be a corporation 
under the same principle.  Considering solely the proposed rule for 
classifying business entities, that would appear to make the foreign parent 
solely liable for tax on the earnings derived by the U.S. operating 
company.  If the foreign parent is domiciled in a jurisdiction that imposes 
no tax on corporate earnings (e.g., the Cayman Islands), then the income 
would effectively be insulated from any tax (U.S. or foreign) until the 
foreign parent pays a dividend to the shareholders.   
However, under current tax rules, any foreign corporation is subject to 
U.S. tax on its taxable income that is effectively connected with a trade 
 
 361. I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(A) (2005). 
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or business in the United States.362  In the case of a wholly owned 
subsidiary, the subsidiary’s separate existence would be disregarded, 
causing its activities to be attributed to the parent.363  Thus, if the U.S. 
operating company derives all of its income from conducting business in 
the U.S., the tax bill of the foreign parent would be identical to the tax bill 
of the U.S. operating company in the absence of a tiered structure.   
B. Possible Concerns and Considerations 
Berle and Means suggested that concentration of ownership would not 
be the only factor affecting the dynamics of a corporation. Devices that 
realign power within a firm might produce the same result. For example, 
in the case of a corporation, the firm could issue both voting stock and 
nonvoting stock. If the voting stock were held by a sufficiently small 
number of shareholders, that group would be in a position to dictate the 
firm’s policies, no matter how dispersed the nonvoting shares are actually 
held. Different classes of stock could be used to produce the same result 
if one class of stock gave shareholders the right to fill a controlling 
number of board seats, leaving the other class with token membership on 
the board.    
These possibilities might lead one to consider adjusting the proposed 
entity classification rule so that it accounts for concentration of voting 
power, not just concentration of ownership. Indeed, concentration of 
voting power appears often in the rules surveyed in Part VI, but it plays a 
very inconsistent role. It is not a factor in the personal holding company 
rules. Nor was it a factor in the foreign personal company rules when they 
were first adopted in 1937. Fifty years later, a firm met the ownership test 
if a concentration of either voting power or value was present. 
Concentration of voting power was the only factor used in the controlled 
foreign corporation provisions when they were first adopted in 1962. 
Today, the ownership test would be met if a concentration of either voting 
power or value was present. The common controlled corporation rules 
also consider the concentration of either voting power or value. The 
passive activity rules refer to the ownership test in the personal holding 
company rules, where concentration of voting power is irrelevant. Under 
the limitation on benefits provision, a firm must have both a concentration 
of voting power and value. 
These anti-abuse rules must be considered in light of the purpose they 
are designed to serve. Each one is targeted at a specific abuse of the 
corporate form to disguise one’s identity in order to avoid tax.  Using 
 
 362. I.R.C. § 882(a) (2017).   
 363. A parallel rule applies when there are multiple owners operating in partnership.  See I.R.C. § 
875(1) (1966).   
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voting power as an alternative way to classify all firms (not just 
incorporated firms) for all purposes could be problematic because it might 
open the door to a specific tax planning opportunity. Firms whose 
interests are sufficiently dispersed to qualify as a corporation could 
deliberately concentrate power solely to qualify as a partnership. On the 
other hand, basing a firm’s classification solely on the concentration of 
ownership presents the risk that a firm whose ownership is dispersed 
would be treated as a corporation even though power might be sufficiently 
concentrated to make the firm an extension of the individuals belonging 
to the control group. It is difficult to determine the magnitude of these two 
risks; in fact, they may cancel each other out. However, given the 
objective to design a mandatory rule that is not subject to manipulation, 
the most sensible approach may be for the entity classification rules to 
focus solely on concentration of ownership.   
Indeed, the overall objective of this Article is to determine when firms 
can be expected to function as extensions of their owners.  This will be 
the case only when the owners also manage the firm; the interests of the 
owners will diverge from those of its managers when there is an actual 
separation of ownership and control.  Therefore, the more sensible choice 
would be to distinguish firms solely by considering concentration of 
ownership.  
C. The Benefits of a Mandatory Entity Classification Rule 
If concentration of ownership became the basis for classifying business 
firms, there would little justification for the Internal Revenue Code to 
contain more than one version of the partnership model for taxing 
business profits. Thus, the S corporation rules could become obsolete.364  
It may also be necessary to reconsider the rationale for many anti-abuse 
rules that now litter the Internal Revenue Code. The most obvious 
candidates for reexamination would be the personal holding company 
rules and the other provisions discussed in Part VI, all of which now use 
some version of the concentration of ownership test. In addition, the 
classification rules could potentially serve as a substitute for defining a 
consolidated group of corporations.  
The most significant benefit, however, may be that this alternative 
system for classifying business firms would foreclose a variety of tax 
 
 364. The idea of unifying the partnership and S corporation rules has been proposed elsewhere.  See 
Willard Taylor, Does One Size Fit All? Should There Be a Single Set of Federal Income Tax Rules for S 
Corporations and Partnerships? 8 OHIO STATE ENTREPREN. BUS. L. J. 327 (2013) (evaluating a proposal 
considered in WAYS & MEANS COMM., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE WAYS AND MEANS 
COMMITTEE DISCUSSION DRAFT PROVISIONS TO REFORM THE TAXATION OF SMALL BUSINESSES AND 
PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES (2013)).  
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avoidance techniques that now depend on a firm’s tax classification.  
Consider, for example, a very common tax avoidance technique that is 
currently available when a closely held firm is classified as a corporation. 
If the owners also work for the firm and want to access the firm’s profits, 
they typically have two options for doing so.  They could either receive a 
dividend on their stock or compensation for their work.  If the payout is 
structured as compensation, the shareholder-employee would have to pay 
both income and employment tax, while the firm could deduct the 
payment itself and any payroll taxes that would apply.  By contrast, if the 
payment took the form of a dividend, the payment would not lead to a 
reduction in the firm’s tax liability, while causing the recipient to incur 
income (but not employment) tax on the amount received.  Individual 
circumstances would dictate which choice would trigger the lowest 
combined tax, but the larger point is that the option itself is available 
solely because the employee-owners control the firm and chose to classify 
it as a corporation.  
This particular tax planning option would not exist under the proposed 
mandatory classification system.  If the firm’s ownership is sufficiently 
concentrated, the firm would be classified as a partnership, and, under 
current rules, the owner would be taxed on his entire share of the earnings, 
no matter what.  By contrast, if the firm’s ownership is sufficiently 
dispersed, the firm will be acting in its own self-interest, not in the service 
of any individual owner or group of owners.  As a result, market factors, 
not tax considerations, will drive decisions about the amount and structure 
of any payout to an owner. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The tax system would not need a way to classify business firms if it 
contained only one method for taxing business profits.  However, because 
the U.S. has two distinctively different ways to tax business profits, it is 
imperative to have a rational way to determine when one method prevails 
over the other.  Throughout the existence of the modern income tax, the 
method for taxing a firm’s profits has always depended on a firm’s tax 
classification.  However, there has never been a satisfactory way to 
establish that classification because there has never been a satisfactory 
way to distinguish firms.  The formalistic and legalistic factors that used 
to matter were inadequate because taxpayers could simply manipulate the 
factors to achieve their tax objectives without compromising economic 
outcomes.  That experience revealed the need to develop a more 
substantive basis for distinguishing firms for tax purposes.  In short, we 
need a tax theory of the firm.   
This Article offers a tax theory of the firm whose organizing principle 
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is concentration of ownership.  That principle explains the very reason 
why the U.S. initially adopted the corporate tax as an alternative to the 
traditional way of taxing firms as if they were extension of their owners.  
The principle is supported by longstanding economic theories that explain 
the behavior of firms.  The principle lies at the heart of a wide range of 
anti-abuse rules that effectively treat a firm as a partnership when it is 
classified as a corporation.  And each of those rules adopts a similar 
formula to translate the concentration of ownership principle into an 
objective test to determine whether a firm should be respected as such or 
not:  whether five or fewer individuals own over half the value of the firm.  
The concentration of ownership principle, as expressed by this formula, 
represents a viable and defensible way to distinguish firms for tax 
purposes.  It deserves to serve as the organizing principle for a 
comprehensive tax theory of the firm that can dictate the way a firm is 
classified for tax purposes.  Until the government adopts such a unifying 
theory of the firm, the tax system will fail to tax business profits in an 
equitable way. 
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